I. Introduction

When entering into a reinsurance agreement, a ceding company and a reinsurer may also enter into a related reinsurance trust agreement  

As we count down the days until the New Year, we are reminded of the momentous year we will leave behind us on December 31. While memorable for many things, 2009 may long be remembered as a year of record corporate insolvency. In 2009, General Motors, CIT, Chrysler, and Thornburg Mortgage filed four of the ten largest corporate bankruptcies in U.S. history. Equally notable are the number of corporate filings made in 2009.

Many companies secured their financing several years ago when the credit market featured advantageous pricing and loose loan covenants. Because these favorable terms would be impossible for borrowers to obtain in today’s lending environment, many viable companies with highly leveraged capital structures are looking for strategies to remove debt and, at the same time, to preserve, or “reinstate,” the favorable financing deals they secured before the markets crashed.

In an October 13, 2009 decision involving bankrupt homebuilder TOUSA, Inc. (“TOUSA”), the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida (the “Court”) avoided as fraudulent transfers certain liens given and debt obligations incurred by several of TOUSA’s subsidiaries to a syndicate of lenders who provided $500 million of new loans to TOUSA. In addition, the Court ordered those lenders, and others that received the proceeds of the new loans, to repay hundreds of millions of dollars to the bankrupt estates of these subsidiaries.

On October 13, 2009, a Florida bankruptcy judge in the TOUSA, Inc.

The recent Scottish Court Opinion on Scottish Lion’s proposed solvent scheme of arrangement,1 in which it was held that to sanction a solvent scheme there must be a “problem requiring a solution” and, in effect, unanimous creditor approval, was followed by a short hearing on Wednesday 14th October in which Lord Glennie said that he would dismiss the petition for the scheme.

On September 15, 2009, in an order read from the bench, the Honorable James M. Peck, Bankruptcy Judge in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of NewYork, and the presiding judge in the Chapter 11 proceedings of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. (“LBHI”) and other associated Lehman Brothers United States entities, held a key provision of the standard ISDA Master Agreement unenforceable in a bankruptcy context.

Almost all large (and many small) companies in today’s economy use derivatives in one way or another to hedge against future risk.

On August 11, 2009, in a closely monitored dispute in the bankruptcy proceeding of General Growth Properties, Inc. (“GGP”), the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York rejected motions filed by several mortgage lenders to dismiss the bankruptcy filings of certain special purpose entity subsidiaries (SPEs) of GGP. In re General Growth Properties, Inc., et al., No. 09-11977, slip op. (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 11, 2009).

In the recent heyday of real estate and structured finance, the use of “bankruptcy–remote” special purpose entities (SPEs) as borrowers was a fundamental underwriting requirement by lenders in many loans, and a critical factor considered by ratings agencies, to shield lenders and their collateral from the potentially adverse impact of bankruptcy filings by their borrowers’ parents and siblings.