Buying natural gas assets from financially distressed companies is an inherently risky proposition.  Even when an attractive prospect is identified, the purchaser has to overcome a number of issues such as clearing up title, including mechanic and materialman liens and getting assignments of contracts and lessor consents.  Assuming these hurdles can be managed, the purchaser is also faced with legacy liability problems ranging from plugging and abandonment and decommissioning costs, unknown claims from interest owners under joint operating agreements, general claims from oil field

Technological innovation has changed the landscape of domestic natural gas production from shortage to surplus. The result: a glut of natural gas and historically low prices. While many producers have successfully hedged against this risk to date, as older hedges roll off, many companies are unable to obtain replacement hedges at attractive prices. Some have even resorted to monetizing their in-the-money hedges to raise capital today (and borrowing against the future).

On March 20, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) proposed a rule (Proposed Rule), with request for comments, that implements section 210(c)(16) of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (the Dodd-Frank Act or the Act) , which permits the FDIC, as receiver for a financial company whose failure would pose a significant risk to the financial stability of the United States (a covered financial company), to enforce contracts of subsidiaries or affiliates of the covered financial company despite contract clauses that purport to terminate, accelerate, or provide

The Delaware Chancery Court recently found that exigent circumstances necessitated the appointment of a receiver for an insolvent company under section 291 of the Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL). The insolvent company at issue had $1.9 million in tax debt and was at risk of losing a favorable settlement opportunity with the IRS due to an impasse between voting and non-voting shareholders.

On January 20, the DOL made its semiannual regulatory agenda and regulatory plan statement available on its website. The regulatory agenda is the list of regulations the DOL expects to have under active consideration for promulgation, proposal or review during the following 6 to 12 months.

The Issue

The issue is whether a Chapter 11 plan can be crammed down over the secured lender’s objection where the plan provides for the sale or transfer of the secured lender’s collateral with the proceeds going to the secured lender without the secured lender having the right to credit bid for is collateral up to the full amount of its claim.  

The United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware (the Court) recently granted a motion to dismiss a mezzanine borrower’s chapter 11 bankruptcy petition at the outset of the debtor’s case.¹ In In re JER/Jameson Mezz Borrower II, LLC, The Court found that the debtor’s petition had been filed in bad faith because, among other things, a junior mezzanine lender had directed the debtor to file the petition with the intent of hindering a senior mezzanine lender’s foreclosure efforts and without any valid reorganization purpose.

Can a U.S. patent licensee whose license has been rejected by a licensor under foreign law in a foreign bankruptcy rely on the protections of § 365(n) of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code? On October 28, 2011, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Virginia issued an opinion addressing this in the Chapter 15 case of Qimonda AG (“Qimonda”).⁵ The bankruptcy court held that the application of § 365(n) to executory licenses to U.S. patents was required to sufficiently protect the interests of U.S.

The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York issued a memorandum decision in the Lehman Brothers Inc. (LBI) liquidation proceeding confirming the LBI trustee’s determination that certain claims relating to TBA contracts do not qualify as customer claims against LBI’s estate.

The McCaskill-Bond Amendment to the Federal Aviation Act provides that a merger of air carriers requires the new entity to merge the seniority lists of the two carriers’ employees. Republic Airways acquired Midwest Airlines, and thereafter the Teamsters Union, which represented the flight attendants at Republic’s older carriers, refused to integrate the seniority lists for flight attendants and placed Midwest’s flight attendants at the bottom of the seniority roster. A group of Midwest flight attendants challenged the action, asserting that it violated the amendment.