Background

The claimant, Alun Griffiths (Contractors) Limited, sought judgment for £3,316,487.55 to enforce an adjudicator's decision in its favour against Carmarthenshire County Council.

With the lifting of the restrictions on the presentation of winding up petitions, and the likely cash flow pressures caused by price inflation, it is widely anticipated that we will see an increase in the number of companies subject to winding up proceedings. For any business dealing with a company in financial distress, a recent decision of the High Court of England and Wales serves as an important reminder that transactions which take place before the company has been wound up can be vulnerable to challenge.

The economic fallout from the COVID-19 pandemic will leave in its wake a significant increase in commercial chapter 11 filings. Many of these cases will feature extensive litigation involving breach of contract claims, business interruption insurance disputes, and common law causes of action based on novel interpretations of long-standing legal doctrines such as force majeure.

As the nation hunkers down to combat the novel coronavirus (COVID-19), bankruptcy courts throughout the country have moved quickly to implement procedures to preserve access to the courts while limiting in-person interaction during the crisis. Each court’s specific COVID-19 procedures are different, but they largely prohibit in-person hearings, recognize the need for flexibility and adjournments for non-emergent matters whenever possible, and encourage the creative use of technology to allow as many matters to go forward as scheduled, including evidentiary hearings.

On February 25, 2020, in Rodriguez v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, No. 18-1269 (U.S. 2020), the U.S. Supreme Court effectively ruled that the so-called “Bob Richards rule” should not be used to determine which member of a group of corporations filing a consolidated federal income tax return is entitled to a federal income tax refund.

U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Dennis Montali recently ruled in the Chapter 11 case of Pacific Gas & Electric (“PG&E”) that the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) has no jurisdiction to interfere with the ability of a bankrupt power utility company to reject power purchase agreements (“PPAs”).

The Supreme Court this week resolved a long-standing open issue regarding the treatment of trademark license rights in bankruptcy proceedings. The Court ruled in favor of Mission Products, a licensee under a trademark license agreement that had been rejected in the chapter 11 case of Tempnology, the debtor-licensor, determining that the rejection constituted a breach of the agreement but did not rescind it.

Few issues in bankruptcy create as much contention as disputes regarding the right of setoff. This was recently highlighted by a decision in the chapter 11 case of Orexigen Therapeutics in the District of Delaware.

The judicial power of the United States is vested in courts created under Article III of the Constitution. However, Congress created the current bankruptcy court system over 40 years ago pursuant to Article I of the Constitution rather than under Article III.

The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Merit Management Group, LP v. FTI Consulting, Inc. has appropriately drawn significant attention.