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We’ve all heard it said a million times - if it sounds too good to be true, it probably is. But does that age-old maxim apply to a bankrupt customer offering to pay you 100% of your unsecured claim through a “prepackaged” bankruptcy or under a critical vendor program? The answer can be complicated.

This article explores what it means to be “unimpaired” and paid in full in prepackaged bankruptcies and under critical vendor programs and outlines some of the potential pitfalls that can be faced by unsecured creditors under these scenarios.

We’ve all heard it said a million times - if it sounds too good to be true, it probably is. But does that age-old maxim apply to a bankrupt customer offering to pay you 100% of your unsecured claim through a “prepackaged” bankruptcy or under a critical vendor program? The answer can be complicated. 

This article explores what it means to be “unimpaired” and paid in full in prepackaged bankruptcies and under critical vendor programs and outlines some of the potential pitfalls that can be faced by unsecured creditors under these scenarios.

The Supreme Court this week resolved a long-standing open issue regarding the treatment of trademark license rights in bankruptcy proceedings. The Court ruled in favor of Mission Products, a licensee under a trademark license agreement that had been rejected in the chapter 11 case of Tempnology, the debtor-licensor, determining that the rejection constituted a breach of the agreement but did not rescind it.

On May 20, 2019, the U.S. Supreme Court issued an 8-1 ruling in the case of Mission Product Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC. The decision resolves a circuit split, holding that a licensee may retain its right to use licensed trademarks, notwithstanding the debtor-licensor’s rejection of the contract in bankruptcy. The Supreme Court’s decision has potentially far-reaching implications.

In normal circumstances, a director’s primary duty (owed to the company, not the company’s shareholders or the corporate group) is to promote the success of the company for the benefit of its shareholders as a whole. When a company enters a period of financial distress (the so-called “zone of insolvency”) there is a shift of emphasis in the duties of the directors: directors must consider the interests of the company’s creditors and, depending on the extent of the financial distress, may need to prioritise such interests over those of its members.

When a company enters a period of financial distress, directors must consider the interests of the company’s creditors and, depending on the extent of the financial distress, may need to prioritise such interests over those of its members. In such distressed situations, the key current heads of liability directors may face (for which they may potentially incur personal liabilities) include wrongful trading, fraudulent trading, misfeasance and breach of duty.

On April 23, 2019, Ropes & Gray, representing a large group of shareholder defendants, won a decision in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York that provides potential fraudulent transfer protection for payments made to shareholders in leveraged buyouts, stock redemptions and other securities transactions.

Constructive Fraudulent Transfer Claims and the Securities Safe Harbor

Few issues in bankruptcy create as much contention as disputes regarding the right of setoff. This was recently highlighted by a decision in the chapter 11 case of Orexigen Therapeutics in the District of Delaware.

The judicial power of the United States is vested in courts created under Article III of the Constitution. However, Congress created the current bankruptcy court system over 40 years ago pursuant to Article I of the Constitution rather than under Article III.

Southeastern Grocers (operator of the Winn-Dixie, Bi Lo and Harvey’s supermarket chains) recently completed a successful restructuring of its balance sheet through a “prepackaged” chapter 11 case in the District of Delaware. As part of the deal with the holders of its unsecured bonds, the company agreed that under the plan of reorganization it would pay in cash the fees and expenses of the trustee for the indenture under which the unsecured bonds were issued.