The Supreme Court has not handled its recent major bankruptcy decisions well. The jurisdictional confusion engendered by its 2011 decision in Stern v.

The U.S. Supreme Court held that a secured creditor in a chapter 7 bankruptcy case is protected from having its lien “stripped off” even if the collateral securing its claim is worth less than the claims asserted by a senior secured creditor; i.e.the junior creditor’s secured claim is completely "out of the money.” The June 1, 2015 decision, Bank of America, N.A. v. Caulkett, reaffirmed the Court’s prior holding in Dewsnup v.

On May 26, the U.S. Supreme Court held that, so long as parties knowingly and voluntarily consent, a bankruptcy court can issue final orders on matters that it otherwise would not have the constitutional authority to decide. In Wellness Int’l Network v. Sharif,¹ a highly anticipated decision, the majority of the Supreme Court delivered a pragmatic opinion that quelled fears stemming from the Court’s 2011 decision in Stern v.

Four years ago, in Stern v. Marshall, the Supreme Court stunned many observers by re-visiting separation of powers issues regarding the jurisdiction of the United States bankruptcy courts that most legal scholars had viewed as long settled. Stern significantly reduced the authority of bankruptcy courts, and bankruptcy judges and practitioners both have since been grappling with the ramifications of that decision.

Recently, Corinthian Colleges, Inc., one of the United States' largest for-profit educational conglomerations with 72,000 students across 107 campuses, filed (along with 25 affiliated subsidiaries) a chapter 11 voluntary petition for bankruptcy protection. Corinthian reported $19.2 million of total assets and US$143.1 million of total debts, and plans to liquidate.

What happens when a debtor, whose loan is pooled and securitized, files for bankruptcy? Are payments made to investors recoverable as fraudulent transfers or preferences?

In what appears to be a matter of first impression, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Illinois recently held that payments made to investors in a two tiered securitization structure commonly employed in commercial mortgage-backed securitization (“CMBS”) transactions are largely protected from fraudulent or preferential transfer claims by the securities contract safe harbor set forth in Bankruptcy Code section 546(e). Specifically, in Krol v.

Judge Robert Gerber ruled last week that General Motors LLC (“New GM”), the entity formed in 2009 to acquire the assets of General Motors Corporation (“Old GM”), is shielded from a substantial portion of the lawsuits based on ignition switch defects in cars manufactured prior to New GM’s acquisition of the assets of Old GM in 2009.

When a debtor pays the market cost for goods and services provided to it by third-party vendors, these payments normally cannot be recovered as fraudulent transfers in the U.S. That is because the debtor receives reasonably equivalent value for the payments to its vendors and because the unsuspecting vendors can assert a good faith defense based on the value provided.

Judge Christopher Sontchi issued a notable opinion last week in the bankruptcy case of Energy Future Holdings Corp., et al. (“EFH”), Case No. 14-10979 (D. Del.), ruling that the repayment in full of certain senior secured notes did not trigger an obligation by the debtors to pay a make-whole premium.