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The Second Circuit Court of Appeals has now weighed in on the Bankruptcy Code’s safe harbor provisions. In Enron Creditors Recovery Corp. v. Alfa, S.A.B. de C.V., Docket Nos. 09–5122, 09–5142, 2011 WL 2536101 (2d Cir. June 28, 2011), the Second Circuit Court of Appeals faced an issue of first impression—whether Section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code, which shields certain payments from avoidance actions in bankruptcy, extends to an issuer’s payment to redeem its commercial paper made before maturity.

On January 25, 2010, United States Bankruptcy Court Judge James M. Peck issued a decision that limited the ability of parties to swap transactions to enforce certain of their contractual rights against a counterparty that has filed for bankruptcy. See Lehman Brothers Special Financing Inc. v. BNY Corporate Trustee Services Ltd.1 (the “BNY Decision”).

In Lehman Brothers Special Financing, Inc. v. Ballyrock ABS CDO 2007-1 Limited (In re Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc.), Adv. P. No. 09-01032 (JMP) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. May 12, 2011) [hereinafter “Ballyrock”], the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York held that a contractual provision that subordinates the priority of a termination payment owing under a credit default swap (CDS) to a debtor in bankruptcy, and which caps the amount of the termination payment, may be an unenforceable ipso facto clause under section 541(c)(1)(B).

You will rely on section 355 for nonrecognition, but here you also must rely on section 332 to make the liquidations tax free, without any liquidation-reincorporation problem. It's very clear that you can get the results you want, but not clear why.

LTR 201123022 describes these facts, in simplified form:

In Geltzer v. Mooney (In re MacMenamin’s Grill, Ltd.), Adv. Pro. No. 09-8266 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. April 21, 2011), the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York held that the safe harbor in section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code does not apply to a small, private leveraged buyout (LBO) transaction that posed no systemic risk to the stability of the financial markets.

On April 27, 2011, the United States Supreme Court approved certain amendments to Bankruptcy Rule 2019 requiring disclosures by certain creditors and equity holders in Chapter 11 cases. We expect that amended Rule 20191 (“Amended Rule 2019”) will take effect as a matter of law on December 1, 2011 unless in the interim Congress enacts legislation to reject, modify, or defer the rules, which we view as unlikely.

On April 25, 2011, as widely expected, a group of Lehman creditors holding claims arising from terminated derivatives transactions filed a competing plan of reorganization and related disclosure statement in the Debtors' chapter 11 cases. As a result of the new filing, there are now three competing plans – (1) the Debtors’ Plan, (2) the Ad Hoc Group’s Plan (filed by a group of bondholder creditors) and (3) the Non-Consolidation Plan (filed by the derivative claimants) - in the Lehman bankruptcy proceedings.

The taxpayer was able to convince the court that the creditors who got the stock in the reorganization were not the prior owners. Because the events occurred in 1992, under a prior version of the continuity of proprietary interest rules, continuity of ownership was broken and a section 338(h)(10) election could be made and the basis in the assets inside the corporation stepped up to fair market value, with no tax liability because the seller was in bankruptcy with large net operating losses (NOLs).

The trading rules and conventions of the loan market are well known to its participants. Similarly, the laws and practices governing equity securities trading in the U.S. are quite familiar to securities market professionals. The opportunity for confusion may arise, however, when these two markets quickly converge—for example, when the loans of a reorganized borrower are converted into or satisfied by the issuance of equity securities.

Does this sound familiar? A newly formed entity purchases distressed bank debt after the debtor has proposed a reorganization plan. The purchaser obtains a blocking position and uses its negotiating leverage to obtain control of the plan process and ultimately the borrower’s assets, which have strategic importance to the purchaser.