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On January 19, 2012, the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals issued an opinion in In re River East Plaza, LLC , 2012 WL 169760 (7th Cir. January 19, 2012), affirming an order by the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, granting an undersecured creditor's motion to lift the automatic stay and dismissing the debtor's single asset real case. The debtor attempted to defeat the mortgagee's motion to lift the automatic stay by proposing a "cramdown" Chapter 11 plan of reorganization.

While bankruptcy law and tort law may not seem related, it is important to know if your client has ever gone through a bankruptcy and, if so, the terms of its plan of reorganization. A recent Eighth Circuit decision confirmed the importance of knowing the ins and outs of a client’s bankruptcy and the terms of the applicable plan.

On December 22, 2011, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware inIn re JER/Jameson Mezz Borrower II LLC 1 dismissed with prejudice a mezzanine borrower’s bankruptcy case for bad faith under Section 1112(b) of the Bankruptcy Code. In doing so, the court clarified that the standard in the Third Circuit to evaluate the good faith of a debtor seeking shelter under the umbrella of Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code is an objective one and does not consider the subjective good faith of a debtor as do courts within the Secon d Circuit.

Generic Legal Advice Memorandum AM 2011-003 (August 18, 2011)

Overview

A promissory note is a one-way undertaking. The maker promises to pay to the payee. There is nothing promised by the payee. The whole point of having a promissory note is to have a document that clearly states an obligation to pay. By contrast, most contracts are bilateral, meaning that each party promises to do something. And those promises are usually mutually dependent: if one party breaches, then the other may be excused from further performance. But that is not the case with a promissory note.

The Second Circuit Court of Appeals has now weighed in on the Bankruptcy Code’s safe harbor provisions. In Enron Creditors Recovery Corp. v. Alfa, S.A.B. de C.V., Docket Nos. 09–5122, 09–5142, 2011 WL 2536101 (2d Cir. June 28, 2011), the Second Circuit Court of Appeals faced an issue of first impression—whether Section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code, which shields certain payments from avoidance actions in bankruptcy, extends to an issuer’s payment to redeem its commercial paper made before maturity.

In Lehman Brothers Special Financing, Inc. v. Ballyrock ABS CDO 2007-1 Limited (In re Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc.), Adv. P. No. 09-01032 (JMP) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. May 12, 2011) [hereinafter “Ballyrock”], the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York held that a contractual provision that subordinates the priority of a termination payment owing under a credit default swap (CDS) to a debtor in bankruptcy, and which caps the amount of the termination payment, may be an unenforceable ipso facto clause under section 541(c)(1)(B).

You will rely on section 355 for nonrecognition, but here you also must rely on section 332 to make the liquidations tax free, without any liquidation-reincorporation problem. It's very clear that you can get the results you want, but not clear why.

LTR 201123022 describes these facts, in simplified form:

In Geltzer v. Mooney (In re MacMenamin’s Grill, Ltd.), Adv. Pro. No. 09-8266 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. April 21, 2011), the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York held that the safe harbor in section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code does not apply to a small, private leveraged buyout (LBO) transaction that posed no systemic risk to the stability of the financial markets.

Yesterday, we announced the results of our fourth annual Reuters HedgeWorld & Dykema Insolvency Outlook Survey, which provides an inside look at the distressed investing landscape through the eyes of 100 hedge fund managers.