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In Finnerty v Clark, the Court of Appeal has given guidance on what constitutes "good and sufficient" grounds for the removal of administrators. In this case, shareholders of a company in administration were also substantial creditors of the company. They wished the administrators to raise proceedings under Section 244 of the Insolvency Act 1986 (extortionate credit transactions) to challenge loan agreements that had been entered into by the company prior to administration.

The recent case of Stephen Petitioner offers some clarification regarding issues relating to the validity of appointment of administrators.

The Facts

The City of Harrisburg, Pennsylvania—the state's capital—filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 9 of the United States Bankruptcy Code on Wednesday October 12, 2011, indicating that it owed fewer than 50 creditors more than $545 million.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, applying Ohio law, has held that a dishonesty exclusion barred coverage under primary and excess directors and officers (D&O) policies for the Wrongful Acts of the principals of a bankrupt company, all of whom were criminally convicted of securities fraud and related crimes.  The Unencumbered Assets Trust v. Great American Insurance Co., et. al., 2011 WL 4348128 (S.D. Ohio Sept.

The United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware, applying federal law, has held that certain lawsuits brought by a bankruptcy trustee were related claims, even though they alleged unique causes of action, because they were based upon the same course of conduct.  The court also found that the trustee was pursuing claims both on behalf of the policyholder-debtor and its subsidiaries, and therefore the application of the insured versus insured exclusion was “unclear.”  Nonetheless, the court found that the individual insureds were entitled to 100% of their defense cos

Sections 216 and 217 of the Insolvency Act impose draconian sanctions on directors of liquidated companies who reuse "prohibited names". Prohibited names are names that are identical to, or "suggest an association with", a company that has gone into liquidation and of which they were previously directors. The sanctions include criminal penalties and personal liability for debts. It has always been difficult for advisers to confidently advise directors whether a proposed name for a new company would be a prohibited name, given the vague nature of the phrase "suggest an association".

An Illinois appellate court, applying Indiana and federal law, has held that neither a bankruptcy exclusion nor an insured versus insured exclusion applied to bar coverage for claims brought by a bankruptcy trustee.  Yessenow v. Exec. Risk Indem., Inc., 2011 WL 2623307 (Ill. App. Ct. June 30, 2011).

The Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, Third Division, applying Indiana and federal law, has held that neither a bankruptcy nor an insured versus insured exclusion applied to bar coverage for claims brought by a bankruptcy trustee.  According to the court, the bankruptcy exclusion is unenforceable because coverage arises from a policy that is a property interest of the debtors, and that property interest is protected under Section 541 of the Bankruptcy Code.  The insured versus insured exclusion did not apply, the court held, because the policyholder and a court-appointe

The United States District Court for the Central District of California has granted motions by eight directors and officers liability insurers to withdraw the reference to the bankruptcy court of two coverage actions involving coverage for claims against former directors and officers of a bank holding company.  In re IndyMac Bancorp, Inc., Nos. CV11-02600; CV11-02605; CV11-02950; CV11-02988 (C.D. Cal. May 17, 2011).  Wiley Rein LLP represents an excess insurer and the primary Side A insurer in the litigation.

The United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Nevada has held that proceeds from a professional liability policy were not property of the insured-debtors' bankruptcy estate because the proceeds were payable only for the benefit of third party claimants and could not be accessed by the debtors directly.  In re Endoscopy Center of Southern Nevada, Nos. BK-S-09-22780-MKN, S-09-22776-MKN, S-09-22784-MKN, 2011 WL 2184387 (Bankr. D. Nev. May 23, 2011).