In late 2011, bondholders in the bankruptcy case of power company Dynegy Holdings, LLC (Dynegy) moved for the appointment of a bankruptcy examiner to investigate certain transactions that occurred immediately prior to the filing of Dynegy's bankruptcy petition. The transactions at issue involve the alleged transfer of millions of dollars in assets to Dynegy's parent company (a non-debtor) approximately two months prior to the bankruptcy filing.
In the recent decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Toronto-Dominion Bank and Her Majesty the Queen (2012 SCC 1), the Supreme Court succinctly agreed with the reasons of Justice Noël of the Federal Court of Appeal.
In the decision of Justice Morawetz of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice (Commercial List) (the “Court”) in In the Matter of Aero Inventory (UK) Limited and Aero Inventory PLC, the Court held that proceeds of a fraudulent preference action recovered by a trustee in bankruptcy under section 95 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (“BIA”) may be subject to the rights of secured creditors, to the extent secured creditors had rights in the collateral in question at the time of the impugned transaction.
In the recently released Judgment in Bank of Montreal v. Peri Formwork Systems Inc.1, the British Columbia Court of Appeal was called upon to decide whether a Monitor, under the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act (“CCAA”)2, or a Receiver, under the Builders Lien Act 3, could borrow monies to complete a development project in priority to claims of builder’s liens registered against the project.
Rayford Homes granted security to two lenders, its trustee shareholder and the Bank of Scotland (BoS). The parties entered into an intercreditor agreement (ICA) using the BoS standard form. In a schedule to that agreement was a definition of the term ‘BoS Priority’ over ‘BoS Debt’ up to a monetary limit. The amount was not filled in, nor was the term ‘BoS priority’ actually used in the ICA.
An English rugby club (an unincorporated association of its members) engaged the services of Barnes Webster & Sons (BWS), a construction company. The club’s treasurer signed the contract, which was witnessed by Davies, the club’s president. The club agreed to pay BWS a fixed price plus additional amounts for certain variations in the work, should they arise. The variations were required, but the club did not pay the £147,000 bill for them that BWS presented. BWS made a demand on Davies personally, which he moved to set aside.
The District Court in Manhattan seems to have put the nail in the coffin of triangular set-off in insolvency – that is, the ability of affiliates to set off their claims against an insolvent debtor: In re Lehman Brothers Inc. (SDNY, 4 October 2011).
A federal district court, applying Pennsylvania law, has held that the insolvency exclusion in an insurance agency’s professional liability policy excused the insurer from the duty to defend the agency in lawsuits alleging that it had caused employee benefit plans that it created to be underfunded. ACE Capital Limited v. Morgan Waldon Ins. Management, LLC, Civil Action No. 11-128, 2011 WL 5914275 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 28, 2011).
Saul Katz and Fred Wilpon, owners of the New York Mets baseball team, invested in Bernard Madoff’s Ponzi scheme. Irving Picard, the trustee appointed under the Securities Investor Protection Act to liquidate the business of Madoff and Madoff Securities, sought to recover over $1 billion from Katz and Wilpon on the grounds that they had made money from Madoff through fraud, constructive fraud and preferential transfers in violation of federal bankruptcy law and New York debtor-creditor law.
On October 28, 2011, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Virginia issued an opinion with significant ramifications for any holder of a patent license that operates internationally. At issue was an important protection afforded to patent licensees under the United States Bankruptcy Code, § 365(n), which limits a debtor's right to reject intellectual property licenses in bankruptcy and generally provides that, in the event of a rejection, the licensee may elect either to treat the license as terminated or retain its rights for the duration of the license.