Ordinarily, a company entering liquidation is considered the commercial equivalent of “game over”, “checkmate”, “the end”, “K.O” or whatever other synonyms creditors can conjure up. This would be true for the most part because, at the end of the liquidation process, the company is usually deregistered and ceases to exist.
However, in some cases it is possible for the liquidator, a creditor or a “contributory” (member) of the company to apply to the Court for an order terminating the winding up. If made, this would return control of the company to the directors.
The statutory demand is a formidable card up a creditor’s sleeve that can result in a company being deemed to be insolvent if it does not pay the creditor’s debt within 21 days of service of the demand. Whether a statutory demand served on an incorporated body other than an Australian company will be effective largely depends on the State or Territory in which the incorporated body is based and whether it is served pursuant to the correct section of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (Corporations Act).
What is a statutory demand?
On May 22, 2018, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit issued its decision in Franchise Services of North America v. United States Trustees (In re Franchise Services of North America), 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 13332 (5th Cir. May 22, 2018). That decision affirms the lower court’s holding that a “golden share” is valid and necessary to filing when held by a true investor, even if such investor is controlled by a creditor.
On 24 August 2017, Messrs Park, Olde and Hansell were appointed joint and several administrators of SurfStitch Group Limited. Prior to their appointment, two shareholder class actions were commenced against SurfStitch. The administrators identified 3,313 shareholders who may be potential group members in the class actions.
Summary
It may now be easier for Australian insolvency practitioners to carry out investigations and recover assets located in Hong Kong and in mainland China. On 8 February 2018, and for the first time, the High Court of Hong Kong granted an application for recognition and assistance in that jurisdiction for voluntary liquidators of an entity incorporated in the British Virgin Islands.
The High Court will consider the validity of “holding” deed of company arrangements (commonly known as “holding DOCAs”) under the Part 5.3A of the Corporations Act (theAct).
The Circuit Courts of Appeal have split on whether a prepetition transfer made by a debtor is avoidable if the transfer was made through a financial intermediary that was a mere conduit. Today, the Supreme Court unanimously resolved the split by deciding that transfers through “mere conduits” are not protected. This is a major (and adverse) decision for lenders, bondholders and noteholders who receive payments through an intermediary such as a disbursing agent.
In a previous article, The Eagle and the Bear: Russian Proceedings Recognized Under Chapter 15, we discussed In re Poymanov, in which the Bankruptcy Court (SDNY) recognized a Russian foreign proceeding under chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code even though the debtor had only nominal assets in the United States (the “Recognition Order”). The Bankruptcy Court had declined to rule upon recognition whether the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C.
1. Section 90K(1)(aa) of theFamily Law Act1975 (Cth) provides that a court may set aside a financial agreement if the court is satisfied that a party to the agreement entered into the agreement for purposes including the purpose of defrauding or defeating creditors, or with reckless disregard to the interests of the creditors.