On May 8, 2017, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Florida entered an order compelling production of attorney-client communications between Regions Bank and its counsel, finding that Regions had put those communications “at issue” by raising a good faith affirmative defense under 11 U.S.C. § 548(c) in response to a fraudulent transfer claim brought against it. Welch v. Regions Bank (In re Mongelluzzi), No. 8:14-ap-00653-CED (Bankr. M.D. Fla. May 8, 2017), ECF No. 319 (Delano, J.) (herein Mongelluzzi).
In First Southern National Bank v. Sunnyslope Housing Limited Partnership, No. 12-17241 (9th Cir. May 26, 2017), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in an en banc decision, held that, for purposes of confirmation of a plan of reorganization over a mortgagee’s objection, the value of the mortgagee’s secured claim was the value of the property as low income housing not the value the mortgagee would have received on foreclosure free of the low income housing restrictions.
The number of consumer claims filed since the Great Recession has skyrocketed. These claims include alleged violations of an “alphabet soup” of federal and state consumer protection statutes. These statutes allow prevailing plaintiffs to recover some combination of actual damages, statutory damages, and even attorney’s fees. They also present a minimal risk of liability for defense costs if the plaintiff does not prevail, which makes these types of claims enticing for plaintiffs’ attorneys.
In our recent article, Jevic: Breathing New Life Into Priority Disputes, we discussed the then-pending motions for settlement and dismissal inIn re Constellation Enterprises LLC,et al.,16-bk- 11213 (CSS) (D. Del.). Constellation’s settlement motion proposed to transfer assets to the General Unsecured Creditor Trust over the claims of priority creditors and faced strong opposition in the wake of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Czyzewski et al., v. Jevic Holding Corp., et al., 137 S.
In our article, Jevic: The Supreme Court Gives Structure to Chapter 11 Structured Dismissal, we discussed the narrow holding of Czyzewski et al., v. Jevic Holding Corp., et al., 137 S. Ct. 973, 985 (2017) (“Jevic”), which prohibits non-consensual structured dismissals that violate the Bankruptcy Code’s priority principles.
On May 3, 2017, the Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico (the “Oversight Board”), acting on behalf of the cash-strapped Commonwealth of Puerto Rico (the “Commonwealth”), filed for bankruptcy protection in the District Court for the District of Puerto Rico. The Commonwealth’s Title III Petition for Covered Territory or Covered Instrumentality (the “Petition”) was filed in accordance with Title III of the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act (“PROMESA”), codified at 48 U.S.C. § 2161, et seq.
Last year we reported (here) that Alberta’s Redwater Energy Corporation decision signaled good news for lenders and noteholders secured by Alberta O&G assets because the federal Canadian Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (“BIA”) prevailed over conflicting provisions in the provincial regulations promulgated by the Alberta Energy Regulator (“AER”).
Last year, we reported that Australia had proposed significant insolvency reforms that, in our view, are long overdue ("A Major Leap Forward for Australian Insolvency Laws").
On March 22, 2017, the Supreme Court, in Czyzewski et al., v. Jevic Holding Corp., et al., confirmed that the Bankruptcy Code does not permit “priority skipping” in Chapter 11 structured dismissals. In doing so, the Court held that, although the Code does not explicitly provide what, if any, priority rules apply to the distribution of estate assets in a Chapter 11 structured dismissal, “[a] distribution scheme in connection with the dismissal of a Chapter 11 case cannot, without the consent of the affected parties, deviate from the basic priority rules that apply under the . . .
In Pacifica L 51 LLC v. New Investments, Inc. (In re New Investments, Inc.), 840 F.3d 1137 (9th Cir. 2016), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that Section 1123(d) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that a cure amount may include a post-default rate of interest if the underlying loan documents and applicable non-bankruptcy law provide for the payment of post-default rate interest upon a default.