A third court confirms that settlement payments are still settlement payments and early redemptions of notes prior to maturity are exempted from preference actions.

Yesterday (September 12, 2012) the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas provided an excellent lesson on the need to know what sauce is going into the stew that governs privileged communications in bankruptcy proceedings.[1]

In the case of In re Santa Ysabel Resort and Casino, the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of California heard arguments on September 4, 2012, as to whether the alleged debtor, a tribal casino, was eligible for bankruptcy protection. The court concluded the casino was not an eligible debtor under the Bankruptcy Code.

Whether you are a John Donne, Ernest Hemingway or Metallica fan, the above clause rings a bell. Last week the Court of Appeal for Western Australia joined those “Riding the Lighting” and provided its own musings on “For Whom the Bells Tolls” down under. Rather than affirming that the bell tolls for the infamous Spanish guerrilla fighters or a tortured metaphysical poet, the Australian court provided a new answer: The Bell [decision] tolls for “would be” secured lenders.

On August 2, 2012, the Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit issued a decision in Lightfoot v. MXEnergy Electric, Inc. (In re MBS Management Servs., Inc.). No. 11-30553, (5th Cir. Aug. 2, 2012).

As NASA engineers breathe a sigh of relief after the “seven minutes of terror” that was the rover Curiosity’s landing on Mars, recipients of payments under commodity forward contracts can—at least in the Fifth Circuit—rest assured that agreements that meet the basic definition of forward contract contained in section 101(25) of the Bankruptcy Code will be protected from preference liability should their counterparties find themselves in bankruptcy. Last Thursday, in Lightfoot v. MXEnegry Electric, Inc. (In re MBS Management Servs., Inc.). No. 11-30553 (5th Cir. Aug.

The Delaware bankruptcy court in the KB Toys, Inc. cases recently held that a claims purchaser takes a claim subject to certain disabilities of the claim as held by the seller, regardless of whether the claim transfer is deemed a “sale” or an “assignment.” SeeIn re KB Toys, Inc., Case No. 04-10120 (KJC) (Bankr. Del. May 4, 2012). In so ruling, the Delaware court’s decision is somewhat at odds with the decision issued by the District Court for the Southern District of New York in the Enron bankruptcy cases. See Enron Corp. v.

After several years of unusually few corporate defaults, there has recently been an uptick in corporations failing to satisfy their bond and loan obligations. In a number of cases, the debts in question are part of multiple-lien or multi-tranche financing structures that incorporate complex subordination packages. The agreements at issue often go beyond merely subordinating rights to payments.

It is common for lenders to require borrowers to agree to pay a higher interest rate, known as the default rate, following an event of default under a loan. Some loan agreements also require the borrower to pay a fee in the event of a late payment. If the borrower files for bankruptcy protection, the Bankruptcy Code affords special protection to secured creditors with respect to collecting interest.

It is common knowledge that the Bankruptcy Code provides a debtor with a “fresh start” by allowing it to discharge prepetition claims. Similarly, section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code allows a trustee or debtor in possession to sell property of the estate “free and clear” of prior claims. These two concepts, while relatively straightforward, raise a fundamental question — when does a creditor hold a “claim” for purposes of the Bankruptcy Code?