A third court confirms that settlement payments are still settlement payments and early redemptions of notes prior to maturity are exempted from preference actions.

Yesterday (September 12, 2012) the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas provided an excellent lesson on the need to know what sauce is going into the stew that governs privileged communications in bankruptcy proceedings.[1]

In the case of In re Santa Ysabel Resort and Casino, the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of California heard arguments on September 4, 2012, as to whether the alleged debtor, a tribal casino, was eligible for bankruptcy protection. The court concluded the casino was not an eligible debtor under the Bankruptcy Code.

Whether you are a John Donne, Ernest Hemingway or Metallica fan, the above clause rings a bell. Last week the Court of Appeal for Western Australia joined those “Riding the Lighting” and provided its own musings on “For Whom the Bells Tolls” down under. Rather than affirming that the bell tolls for the infamous Spanish guerrilla fighters or a tortured metaphysical poet, the Australian court provided a new answer: The Bell [decision] tolls for “would be” secured lenders.

On August 2, 2012, the Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit issued a decision in Lightfoot v. MXEnergy Electric, Inc. (In re MBS Management Servs., Inc.). No. 11-30553, (5th Cir. Aug. 2, 2012).

As NASA engineers breathe a sigh of relief after the “seven minutes of terror” that was the rover Curiosity’s landing on Mars, recipients of payments under commodity forward contracts can—at least in the Fifth Circuit—rest assured that agreements that meet the basic definition of forward contract contained in section 101(25) of the Bankruptcy Code will be protected from preference liability should their counterparties find themselves in bankruptcy. Last Thursday, in Lightfoot v. MXEnegry Electric, Inc. (In re MBS Management Servs., Inc.). No. 11-30553 (5th Cir. Aug.

Every lender sincerely hopes that, even when its borrower is flat on the floor and seems down for the proverbial count, the borrower will still find the wherewithal to repay it. A lender often starts counting the days after it is repaid until the 90-day preference period (11 U.S.C. §547) has passed. The lender generally breathes a sigh of relief on the 91st day, confident that if its borrower files for bankruptcy, the money paid to the lender is safe from being clawed back by the Bankruptcy Court.

The recently decided case of RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 566 U.S. ____ (2012), puts to rest a conflict among the Third, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits as to the right of secured creditors to credit bid at a proposed sale of their collateral under a plan of reorganization that the secured creditor opposes. The practice of credit bidding is codified in the Bankruptcy Code at 11 U.S.C. §363(k) and is the right of a secured creditor to bid the amount of its secured debt at a debtor’s sale of the creditor’s collateral in bankruptcy.

Today, the Supreme Court of the United States issued its much awaited decision in RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 566 U.S. ______ (2012). The noteworthy decision resolves any uncertainty surrounding a secured creditor’s right to credit bid in a sale under a chapter 11 plan which arose after cases like Philadelphia Newspapers 599 F.3d 298 (3d Cir. 2010) curtailed the right.

TOUSA involved one of the largest fraudulent transfer litigations in bankruptcy history.  The Bankruptcy Court agreed with the Unsecured Creditors’ Committee that both the so-called “New Lenders” and the “Transeastern Lenders” received fraudulent transfers as part of a July 31, 2007 financing transaction.  The District Court reversed in a scathing opinion, but today the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals has reversed the District Court and reinstated the Bankruptcy Court’s opinion in its entirety.  The opinion can be found