The Delaware Bankruptcy Court recently held that a third amendment to a lease agreement entered into for the purpose of leasing a second building could not be severed from the original lease agreement; and the debtor was not allowed to reject the lease on that second building under section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code.
It was just an old jalopy legally repossessed by his credit union . . . until he filed a bankruptcy petition and the red lights of the automatic stay started flashing. Smokey pulled the lender over and started issuing citations so be forewarned, put your hazard lights on and drive carefully through the postpetition fog, because this decision is relevant to all secured creditors under all Bankruptcy Code Chapters, not just car lenders under Chapter 13.
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals recently affirmed the decisions of the courts below and held in an unpublished opinion that a secured lender’s credit bid at a Michigan foreclosure sale extinguished all of the Chapter 13 debtor’s indebtedness to the lender, thereby precluding the lender from executing on a prepetition foreclosure judgment obtained against the debtor in Wisconsin. State Bank of Florence v. Miller (In re Miller), 2013 WL 425342 (6th Cir. Feb. 5, 2013).
In Ben Hur, Judah Ben-Hur’s team of white horses beat Messala’s black horses in the climactic chariot race. In a similar battle to the death in In re Indianapolis Downs, LLC, the white horses won again when Delaware Bankruptcy Judge Brendan L. Shannon confirmed Indianapolis Downs’ joint Chapter 11 plan of liquidation (the “Plan”) over a series of hard-fought objections focusing on the implications of a Restructuring Support Agreement and the propriety of third-party releases.
Last week the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York approved debtor-American Airlines’ motion to enter into a secured financing transaction and repay certain pre-petition aircraft financing without paying make-whole premiums. The indenture trustee sought to ground the motion by asserting that the make-whole had to be paid, but it was the indenture trustee, not American, that crashed and burned.
Last week, the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas granted involuntary bankruptcy petitions against ten US subsidiaries of Mexican glassmaker Vitro S.A.B. de C.V. (the “New Debtor Subsidiaries” and “Vitro”, respectively). The ruling is a win in the multi-paned litigation involving certain petitioning noteholders (the “Noteholders”) in their fight against Vitro’s efforts to effect a non-consensual restructuring of their debt through a Mexican insolvency proceeding.
In a previous Alert that we published in July 2012 entitled “Michigan Court Authorizes Receiver Sale of Real Property Free and Clear of Redemption Rights,” we reported on a decision of a Michigan trial court in Ottawa County, Michigan permitting a state-court receiver to sell real property free and clear of a mortgagor’s redemption rights.
In a fairly controversial decision from January 2012, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of Illinois held that a financing statement must contain the “legal” name of an individual as it appears on the individual’s birth certificate. Miller v. State Bank of Arthur (In re Miller), Adv. P. No. 11-9055 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. Jan. 6, 2012). On appeal, the United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois reversed and held that the Uniform Commercial Code requires only that a “correct” name appear on the financing statement.
A third court confirms that settlement payments are still settlement payments and early redemptions of notes prior to maturity are exempted from preference actions.
Indiana Code Section 32-28-3-9, often referred to as the Personal Liability Notice (PLN) Statute, provides a means for subcontractors, equipment lessors, and laborers to assert a claim against a project owner for amounts owed for labor and material on a construction project. Essentially, the PLN Statute provides a means to assert a lien against funds the owner would otherwise pay to a general contractor, as contrasted to asserting a mechanic’s lien claim against real estate.