Yesterday (September 12, 2012) the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas provided an excellent lesson on the need to know what sauce is going into the stew that governs privileged communications in bankruptcy proceedings.[1]

In the case of In re Santa Ysabel Resort and Casino, the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of California heard arguments on September 4, 2012, as to whether the alleged debtor, a tribal casino, was eligible for bankruptcy protection. The court concluded the casino was not an eligible debtor under the Bankruptcy Code.

The Indiana Court of Appeals recently held in a published opinion that the appointment of a receiver for the benefit of a mortgagee who agreed to subordinate its mortgages was mandatory under Indiana law. PNC Bank, Nat’l Assoc. v. LA Dev., Inc., __ N.W.2d __, 2012 WL 3156539 (Ind. Ct. App. Aug. 6, 2012).

Whether you are a John Donne, Ernest Hemingway or Metallica fan, the above clause rings a bell. Last week the Court of Appeal for Western Australia joined those “Riding the Lighting” and provided its own musings on “For Whom the Bells Tolls” down under. Rather than affirming that the bell tolls for the infamous Spanish guerrilla fighters or a tortured metaphysical poet, the Australian court provided a new answer: The Bell [decision] tolls for “would be” secured lenders.

Like the common law of most other states, Michigan law generally grants to a court-appointed receiver a first priority claim in the receivership proceeding for payment of the receiver’s fees and expenses incurred in that proceeding. See, e.g., In re Dissolution of Henry Smith Floral Co., 260 Mich. 299, 244 N.W. 480 (1932); Cohen v. Cohen, 125 Mich. App. 206, 335 N.W.2d 661 (1983).

On August 2, 2012, the Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit issued a decision in Lightfoot v. MXEnergy Electric, Inc. (In re MBS Management Servs., Inc.). No. 11-30553, (5th Cir. Aug. 2, 2012).

The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Michigan recently held in a published opinion that no statutory or common law landlord’s lien exists under Michigan law. Rather, in order for a landlord to assert a valid lien on the personal property of its tenant, the tenant must have consensually agreed to grant a security interest in the property and the landlord must have perfected such interest in accordance with Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code. In re Kentwood Pharmacy, LLC, ___ B.R. ___, 2012 WL 2899383 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. July 17, 2012).

As NASA engineers breathe a sigh of relief after the “seven minutes of terror” that was the rover Curiosity’s landing on Mars, recipients of payments under commodity forward contracts can—at least in the Fifth Circuit—rest assured that agreements that meet the basic definition of forward contract contained in section 101(25) of the Bankruptcy Code will be protected from preference liability should their counterparties find themselves in bankruptcy. Last Thursday, in Lightfoot v. MXEnegry Electric, Inc. (In re MBS Management Servs., Inc.). No. 11-30553 (5th Cir. Aug.

The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals recently held that the rejection of a trademark license by the trustee did not abrogate the licensee’s rights under a prepetition agreement to use the debtor’s trademark. Sunbeam Products, Inc. v. Chicago American Manufacturing, LLC, __F.3d __, 2012 WL 2687939 (7th Cir. July 9, 2012). The Seventh Circuit decision is contrary to a prior decision by the Fourth Circuit in Lubrizol Enterprises, Inc. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc., 756 F.2d 1043 (4th Cir. 1985).

On May 29, 2012, the United States Supreme Court upheld a secured creditor’s absolute right to credit bid when a debtor files a Chapter 11 plan proposing to sell the secured creditor’s collateral free and clear of the secured creditor’s liens. RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 566 U.S. ___ (2012). In just a little over one month since oral argument, the Supreme Court resolved a conflict between two circuit courts of appeal as to whether a plan could prohibit a secured creditor from credit bidding on its collateral at a sale.