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On November 17, 2011 the IRS issued final Treasury Regulations (the “Final Regulations”) that address the tax consequences of a debtor partnership’s issuance of equity in satisfaction of a debt obligation (a “Partnership Equity-for-Debt Exchange”). The Final Regulations provide debtor partnerships, their partners and creditors with welcome clarity regarding the federal income tax consequences of such restructuring. 

The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York (the Court), has held that section 553(a) of the Bankruptcy Code prohibits a swap counterparty from setting off amounts owed to the debtor against amounts owed by the debtor to affiliates of the counterparty, notwithstanding the safe harbor provision in section 561 of the Bankruptcy Code and language in the ISDA Master Agreement permitting the swap counterparty to effect “triangular” setoffs. In re Lehman Brothers Inc., Case No. 08-01420 (JMP)(SIPA) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. October 4, 2011).

The enforcement of triangular setoffs in bankruptcy, where affiliates set off their claims against the debtor, received another setback in a recent decision in the Lehman bankruptcy cases. See In re Lehman Brothers Inc., No. 08-01420 (JMP) (SIPA), 2011 WL 4553015 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Oct.

In re Zais Investment Grade Ltd. VII1 is the latest in a recent line of bankruptcy cases challenging bedrock assumptions regarding securitization special purpose entities (SPEs) and bankruptcy considerations in securitization transactions.2 Zais establishes precedent allowing a senior noteholder of a collateralized debt obligation (CDO) to place the CDO issuer in an involuntary chapter 11 bankruptcy in order to advance an asset management plan that would otherwise require supermajority approval of all noteholders (including all junior classes) under the related indenture.

The scenario has become all too familiar in recent years: a borrower defaults on a loan and, when the lender pursues the loan collateral through foreclosure or other proceedings, the borrower files for bankruptcy protection. More often than not, when the lender appears in bankruptcy court to pursue its interest in the collateral, the borrower counterattacks with a host of state law lender liability claims.

The Supreme Court of Delaware recently held that creditors of insolvent Delaware limited liability companies (LLCs) lack standing to bring derivative suits on behalf of the LLCs.

In March 2010, CML V brought both derivative and direct claims against the present and former managers of JetDirect Aviation Holdings LLC in the Court of Chancery after JetDirect defaulted on its loan obligations to CML. The Vice Chancellor dismissed all the claims, finding that, as a creditor, CML lacked standing to bring derivative claims on behalf of JetDirect, and CML appealed.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found in favor of the trustee (the Trustee) presiding over the liquidation of Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities (BMIS), affirming the Trustee’s calculation of “net equity” in the BMIS liquidation. The Trustee calculates net equity to determine the value of claims submitted by victims of Madoff’s massive fraud.

Following the Second Circuit’s recent precedent in an Enron appeal (also the subject of a Basis Points blog post), Judge Peck of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York concluded that the redemption of notes prior to maturity was exempt from preference actions under the safe harbor provision of Bankruptcy Code § 546(e). Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Quebecor World (USA) Inc. v. Am. United Life Ins. Co., No. 08-10152 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. July 27, 2011).

Argentine debtors are now subject to employee take-over under the nation’s recently amended bankruptcy code, signed into law by the nation’s President, Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner. Argentine Bankruptcy Law 24,522 as amended by Law No. 26,684,1 allows employees of a bankrupt company who have established a union or cooperative to (i) suspend the enforcement of claims that are filed by creditors for up to 2 years and (ii) ask the judge to appoint the cooperative as the successor to the debtor’s management.