A third court confirms that settlement payments are still settlement payments and early redemptions of notes prior to maturity are exempted from preference actions.
Yesterday (September 12, 2012) the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas provided an excellent lesson on the need to know what sauce is going into the stew that governs privileged communications in bankruptcy proceedings.[1]
In the case of In re Santa Ysabel Resort and Casino, the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of California heard arguments on September 4, 2012, as to whether the alleged debtor, a tribal casino, was eligible for bankruptcy protection. The court concluded the casino was not an eligible debtor under the Bankruptcy Code.
Whether you are a John Donne, Ernest Hemingway or Metallica fan, the above clause rings a bell. Last week the Court of Appeal for Western Australia joined those “Riding the Lighting” and provided its own musings on “For Whom the Bells Tolls” down under. Rather than affirming that the bell tolls for the infamous Spanish guerrilla fighters or a tortured metaphysical poet, the Australian court provided a new answer: The Bell [decision] tolls for “would be” secured lenders.
The Bankruptcy Code provides a number of “safe harbors” for forward contracts and other derivatives. These provisions exempt derivatives from a number of Bankruptcy Code provisions, including portions of the automatic stay,1 restrictions on terminating executory contracts,2 and the method for calculating rejection damages.3 The safe harbor provisions also protect counterparties to certain types of contracts from the avoidance actions created under Chapter 5 of the Bankruptcy Code, such as the preference and fraudulent transfer statutes.4
On August 2, 2012, the Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit issued a decision in Lightfoot v. MXEnergy Electric, Inc. (In re MBS Management Servs., Inc.). No. 11-30553, (5th Cir. Aug. 2, 2012).
As NASA engineers breathe a sigh of relief after the “seven minutes of terror” that was the rover Curiosity’s landing on Mars, recipients of payments under commodity forward contracts can—at least in the Fifth Circuit—rest assured that agreements that meet the basic definition of forward contract contained in section 101(25) of the Bankruptcy Code will be protected from preference liability should their counterparties find themselves in bankruptcy. Last Thursday, in Lightfoot v. MXEnegry Electric, Inc. (In re MBS Management Servs., Inc.). No. 11-30553 (5th Cir. Aug.
- Introduction
Recent cases interpreting Chapter 15 of the United States Bankruptcy Code (11 U.S.C. § 101, et seq., as amended) (the “Bankruptcy Code”) suggest that there are different standards for recognizing whether domestic entities and foreign entities have filed insolvency proceedings in the proper venue.
The Bankruptcy Abuse, Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, which was signed into law in the United States on April 20, 2005 and went into effect, for the most part, on October 17, 2005, created a new chapter of the United States Bankruptcy Code (11 U.S.C. 101, et seq., as amended) (the “Bankruptcy Code”) – Chapter 15. Chapter 15 replaces and modifies the earlier Bankruptcy Code sections that dealt with multi-national insolvency proceedings.
On July 9, 2012, the Seventh Circuit decided in Sunbeam1 that the rejection of a trademark license by a bankrupt trademark licensor does not deprive the trademark licensee of its right to continue to use the trademark, and disagreed with the 1985 Fourth Circuit decision in Lubrizol2 that held to the contrary.3 In reaction to the Lubrizol decision, which held that the rejection of a license by a bankrupt licensor of intellectual property terminated the rights of the licensee, Congress enacted Section 365(n) of the Bankruptcy