Following the Second Circuit’s recent precedent in an Enron appeal (also the subject of a Basis Points blog post), Judge Peck of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York concluded that the redemption of notes prior to maturity was exempt from preference actions under the safe harbor provision of Bankruptcy Code § 546(e). Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Quebecor World (USA) Inc. v. Am. United Life Ins. Co., No. 08-10152 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. July 27, 2011).

Argentine debtors are now subject to employee take-over under the nation’s recently amended bankruptcy code, signed into law by the nation’s President, Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner. Argentine Bankruptcy Law 24,522 as amended by Law No. 26,684,1 allows employees of a bankrupt company who have established a union or cooperative to (i) suspend the enforcement of claims that are filed by creditors for up to 2 years and (ii) ask the judge to appoint the cooperative as the successor to the debtor’s management.

Bankruptcy courts have long debated the issue of whether an unsecured creditor can recover post-petition legal fees under the Bankruptcy Code. In the recent decision of In re Seda France, Inc. (located here), Justice Craig A.

The Second Circuit Court of Appeals has now weighed in on the Bankruptcy Code’s safe harbor provisions. In Enron Creditors Recovery Corp. v. Alfa, S.A.B. de C.V., Docket Nos. 09–5122, 09–5142, 2011 WL 2536101 (2d Cir. June 28, 2011), the Second Circuit Court of Appeals faced an issue of first impression—whether Section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code, which shields certain payments from avoidance actions in bankruptcy, extends to an issuer’s payment to redeem its commercial paper made before maturity.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit issued its much anticipated decision in In Re River Road Hotel Partners, LLC, __ F.3d __ (7th Cir., June 28, 2011). In the closely watched case, the Seventh Circuit declined to follow the Third Circuit’s decision in Philadelphia Newspapers, 599 F.3d 298 (3d Cir. 2010), holding instead that secured lenders have the right to credit bid in “free and clear” asset sales where their liens are being stripped, whether those sales occur under section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code or under a chapter 11 plan.

Enron seems like ancient history but the Second Circuit has just issued an important decision in an Enron appeal confirming that the redemption of commercial paper made through DTC is entitled to the Bankruptcy Code § 546(e) exemption for “settlement payments” and, therefore, exempt from attack as preferential transfers. The Second Circuit held that this is so even though the Enron redemption payments were made prior to stated maturity, becoming the first Circuit Court of Appeal to address this issue. Enron Creditors Recovery Corp. v. Alfa, S.A.B. de C.V.

In Lehman Brothers Special Financing, Inc. v. Ballyrock ABS CDO 2007-1 Limited (In re Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc.), Adv. P. No. 09-01032 (JMP) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. May 12, 2011) [hereinafter “Ballyrock”], the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York held that a contractual provision that subordinates the priority of a termination payment owing under a credit default swap (CDS) to a debtor in bankruptcy, and which caps the amount of the termination payment, may be an unenforceable ipso facto clause under section 541(c)(1)(B).

You will rely on section 355 for nonrecognition, but here you also must rely on section 332 to make the liquidations tax free, without any liquidation-reincorporation problem. It's very clear that you can get the results you want, but not clear why.

LTR 201123022 describes these facts, in simplified form:

In Geltzer v. Mooney (In re MacMenamin’s Grill, Ltd.), Adv. Pro. No. 09-8266 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. April 21, 2011), the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York held that the safe harbor in section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code does not apply to a small, private leveraged buyout (LBO) transaction that posed no systemic risk to the stability of the financial markets.

Make whole premiums sound simple; they are prepayment premiums that are supposed to “make you whole.” More precisely, make whole premiums are intended to protect noteholders (or other debt holders) from the loss of future fixed coupon interest payments due to the early repayment of debt if market interest rates have declined in the interim.