The judgment in the case of Belmont Park Investments Pty Limited v BNY Corporate Trustee Services Limited and Lehman Brothers Special Financing Inc (UKSC 2009/0222), which began to be heard by the UK Supreme Court on March 1, 2011,1 was handed down on July 27, 2011. The case concerns the enforceability of so-called “flip clauses,” which provide that payment obligations owed to different creditors, in this case the swap counterparty and the noteholders, “flip” in priority following a counterparty bankruptcy.

In a decision that is expected to have wide-ranging implications for secured lenders and reorganization plan sales nationwide, the Seventh Circuit’s June 28, 2011 opinion in In re River Road1 marks a jurisdictional split on the contours of credit bidding in bankruptcy. While this decision is squarely at odds with decisions of the Courts of Appeals for the Third and Fifth Circuits, its holding is in many respects a validation of Judge Ambro’s robust dissent in Philadelphia News,2 and is arguably more aligned with mainstream bankruptcy thinking on credit bidding issues.

The July 6, 2011 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Board of Directors (the “FDIC Board”) meeting marked the changing of the guard from Chairman Sheila Bair to FDIC Vice Chairman Martin Gruenberg. Chairman Bair’s valedictory meeting was not merely ceremonial; it also covered several key developments regarding the timing of a final rule on resolution plans under section 165(d) of Title I and a final rule on the Orderly Liquidation Authority (“OLA”) under Title II.

A. RESOLUTION PLANS/ LIVING WILLS

During her lifetime, Vickie Lynn Marshall, publicly known as Anna Nicole Smith (“Vickie”), was hardly a stranger to the prying eyes of the media. Today, the late Vickie is again the subject of media coverage, this time in the context of a fifteen-year legal saga that has twice reached the United States Supreme Court.

A recently proposed rule by the Federal Reserve Board and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation would systemically impose significant bank holding companies and nonbank financial companies to submit annual resolution plans and quarterly credit exposure reports.

When a company saddled with potential environmental liabilities seeks bankruptcy protection, the goals of Chapter 11—giving the reorganized debtor a “fresh start” and fairly treating similarly situated creditors—can conflict with the goals of environmental laws, such as ensuring that the “polluter pays.” Courts have long struggled to reconcile this tension.

This newsletter discusses the draft legislative proposal for a Financial Institutions (Special Measures) Act (Wet bijzondere maatregelen financiële ondernemingen; "Intervention Act") that was recently published for consultation along with a draft explanatory memorandum and a document containing specific questions. The draft proposal would broaden the powers of the Dutch Central Bank (De Nederlandsche Bank; "DNB") and the Minister of Finance to intervene at financial institutions that are experiencing "serious problems".

Introduction

The restructuring practice often calls for creative solutions, especially when the stakes are high and the debtor is in serious financial distress. Many restructuring lawyers have at times faced the question of whether it is possible for a debtor to transfer assets to a creditor subject to the condition precedent of the debtor being declared bankrupt.

The Executive Office of the United States Trustee, part of the Department of Justice, has embarked on an initiative to investigate bankruptcy-related practices of the major mortgage servicers. The United States Trustees have not identified any authority to conduct an investigation beyond specific matters pertaining to individual debtors or their estates.

MERS’s authority to assign mortgages was called into question by a bankruptcy court in New York. In re Agard, 2011 Bankr. LEXIS 488 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. Feb. 10, 2011). In response to the servicer’s motion for relief from the automatic stay, the debtor challenged the servicer’s standing on the ground that MERS lacked the authority to assign the mortgage to the servicer. Because a state court had previously entered a judgment of foreclosure and sale in favor of the servicer, the court was compelled by the Rooker Feldman doctrine to reject the debtor’s claims.