Over the span of two weeks in July 2022, two of the largest retail-facing cryptocurrency platforms, Celsius and Voyager, filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy protection.

In a recent case arising out of the bankruptcy of the Yellowstone Mountain Club, a private ski club for the ultrawealthy, Blixseth v. Brown (In re Yellowstone Mountain Club, LLC) (9th Cir. Nov. 28, 2016), the Ninth Circuit held that plaintiff needed the bankruptcy court’s permission to bring post-petition claims against the chair of Yellowstone’s Unsecured Creditors Committee (“UCC”).

Borrowers, agent banks, syndicate members and secondary market purchasers incur, syndicate, sell and buy bank debt on the assumption that bank debt is not a “security.” However, a June 30, 2016, opinion in the General Motors preference litigation¹shows that such an assumption may no longer be valid, at least under the Bankruptcy Code.

What showing must creditors make to be granted the right to prosecute claims on behalf of the bankruptcy estate?

Client Alert February 5, 2015 Second Circuit to Lenders: Get Your UCC Filings Right By Geoffrey R. Peck and Jordan A. Wishnew1 INTRODUCTION On January 21, 2015, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit issued an opinion regarding a mistaken UCC-3 termination statement that all loan market participants should consider carefully.

A lender cannot rely on its subjective intent in claiming that an otherwise properly filed UCC termination is ineffective, according to a recent decision by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Put another way, if a lender authorizes a termination statement, the termination is valid upon filing such UCC-3 even if the authorization was mistakenly given. While this result is not surprising, it does put lenders (and their counsel) on notice to be diligent in reviewing and authorizing the filing of UCC termination statements.

On August 27, 2007, United States District Judge Shira Scheindlin held that Springfield Associates, an innocent transferee of a claim from Citigroup against Enron, was not subject to certain counterclaims and defenses so long as Springfield was a “purchaser” and not an “assignee” of the claim. See In re Enron Corp. v. Springfield Assocs. L.L.C., No. 07 Civ. 1957, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63129 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 2007).