Under the laws of the UK and Bermuda, solvent insurance companies that had ceased to write new policies have long been able to implement an orderly and expeditious run off of their businesses through court approved schemes of arrangement.
The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Kentucky recently found that a vendor’s filing of a prepetition notice of lis pendens served to place any hypothetical judicial lien creditor, execution creditor, or purchaser of real property on notice of its equitable lien against the property for the unpaid portion of the purchase price. This prepetition notice of lis pendens prevented the debtors-in-possession from avoiding the vendor’s lien in exercise of their strong-arm powers under 11 U.S.C. § 544.
In Hardesty v. CitiFinancial, Inc.,1 the Sixth Circuit affirmed the bankruptcy court’s denial of the trustee’s request to avoid the debtors’ mortgages with the creditor based on allegedly defective certificates of acknowledgement in the mortgage documents under Ohio law.
On February 22, 2011, Judge James M. Peck of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York issued a decision declining to modify the September 20, 2008 Sale Order that approved the sale to Barclays PLC (“Barclays”) of assets collectively comprising the bulk of the North American investment banking and capital markets business of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. (“LBHI”), Lehman Brothers Inc. (“LBI”) and certain of their affiliates (together “Lehman”).
The Indiana Lawyer Announced on March 31, 2011, that the Fair Finance Co.’s bankruptcy trustee had reached a $371,000 settlement with an Indianapolis attorney who was accused of defaulting on a 2003 loan from the business. The trustee had sued the Indiana attorney and his wife, saying that the couple failed to pay off a $250,000 loan that matured in 2006. Accrued interest had raised the amount owed to over $370,000.
The short answer to the title question is “no.” However, under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank” or the “Act”), the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) has limited “back-up” authority to place into liquidation an insurance company that (i) meets certain criteria as respects the nature of its business and (ii) is essentially “too big to fail.” This liquidation proceeding would, however, still be under the relevant state insurance liquidation laws.1
In a second decision of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida involving secured lenders to bankrupt homebuilder TOUSA, Inc., on March 4, 2011, Judge Adalberto Jordan affirmed the dismissal of fraudulent conveyance claims brought against the lenders on a revolving credit facility. In dismissing those claims, the Bankruptcy Court had emphasized that, because the revolving credit agreement was entered into, and the liens securing it were pledged, well before the company's alleged insolvency, they were immune from fraudulent conveyance attack.
A Cuyahoga County, Ohio trial court did not abuse its discretion when it appointed a receiver for a “defunct” foreign corporation that the trial court found “persists for the purpose of winding up its affairs in Ohio.”In re: All Cases against Sager Corporation (2010), 188 Ohio App 3d 796, appeal accepted for review (2011), 127 Ohio St. 3d 1503. The Court of Appeals found it undisputed that corporate assets existed after the foreign corporation had been dissolved, “and that these assets may afford insurance coverage to Ohioans injured by exposure to Sager’s products”.
On February 11, 2011, the Hon. Alan Gold of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida reversed the October 30, 2009 fraudulent conveyance finding issued by the Bankruptcy Court in the TOUSA case as it pertained to lenders involved in TOUSA’s Transeastern joint venture.
On August 28, 2010, Compañía Mexicana de Aviación (“Mexicana”), the third oldest airline in the world and one of the most important airlines in Latin America, stopped flying.