This article provides an analysis of whether a licensee retains the right to use trademarks following rejection of an intellectual property license.  The analysis centers on Section 365(n) of the Bankruptcy Code as well as a recent 7th Circuit opinion interpreting the applicability of that provision to trademarks.  In short, while there does not appear to be unanimity among the Circuits, there is growing authority for the proposition that the right to use trademarks does not necessarily terminate upon rejection of the license.

The Indiana Court of Appeals recently interpreted an ambiguous subordination agreement, finding the subordinated creditor was entitled to the appointment of a receiver over the mortgaged property.  PNC Bank, National Association v. LA Develop., Inc., --- N.E.2d ---, No. 41A01-107-MF-314, 2012 WL 3156539 (Ind. Ct. App. Aug.

Perfection of security interests in intellectual property can be a trap for the unwary.  In general, secured parties are often confused about where to file in order to perfect a security interest.  This is not surprising as the perfection regime differs depending on the type of intellectual property.  As a starting point, one should determine the general rule for the main classes of intellectual property:  trademarks, patents and copyrights.

In a perfect world, a debtor's bankruptcy would involve timely reporting, good faith filings, and full disclosures.  Unfortunately, some debtors either enter the process under a cloud of suspicion or make decisions during the process that suggest the estate has been compromised by fraudulent activity.  Whether the alleged fraud is a complex bust-out scheme or a simple unreported asset transfer, the debtor may face a serious investigation.  Depending on the extent of the allegations, the investigation could be referred as a criminal matter to federal prosecutors.  As the

In Salyersville Nat’l Bank v. Bailey (In re Bailey), 664 F.3d 1026 (6th Cir.

The Government must provide actual notice of forfeiture proceedings to those the Government knows have claimed an interest in property to be forfeited.  In a fact pattern the Sixth Circuit characterized as "befitting a John Grisham novel," the Government dug up (literally) a fraudster’s $250,000 on a golf course.  The Government found the money in October 2009 and instituted forfeiture proceedings.  In November and December 2009, the Government posted a generalized notice of forfeiture on the internet.

The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) filed an objection on June 14, 2012, in the Delaware bankruptcy court proceedings of RG Steel ("Debtor"), challenging a recent sale by RG Steel's parent entity ("Parent") of a 25-percent ownership stake in the Debtor. If the sale is respected, Parent would fall outside of the Debtor's "controlled group" under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), with the result that Parent may cease to have joint liability for the Debtor's unfunded pension obligations.

Where an insured has assigned away its rights to recover available insurance, the insured’s “empty shoes” do not necessarily prevent an excess carrier that pays defense costs rightfully owed by primary carriers from pursuing the primary carriers based a contractual subrogation theory.  An excess carrier proceeding on this basis typically “stands in the shoes of the insured,” obtaining only those rights held by the insured.  Nonetheless, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals found last week that where an excess carrier picks up the bill for an insured’s defense, it may recover fr

If you are one of the lucky product manufacturers who weathered the recent economic downturn well and are looking to buy assets from those who did not survive…beware!

The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Ohio recently held that under Ohio law, the homestead exemption set forth in Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2329.66 applies to contiguous parcels of land only if those parcels are used for a single purpose as the debtor’s homestead.  In re Whitney, 459 B.R. 72 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2011).