《国家税务总局关于纳税人资产重组有关增值税问题的公告》(02/18/2011)

The State Administration of Taxation released the Announcement onIssues Concerning Value-Added Tax Relevant to Taxpayers’ Assets Restructuring (the “VAT Announcement”) on February 18, 2011. The effective date of the Announcement is March 1, 2011.

The Indiana Lawyer Announced on March 31, 2011, that the Fair Finance Co.’s bankruptcy trustee had reached a $371,000 settlement with an Indianapolis attorney who was accused of defaulting on a 2003 loan from the business. The trustee had sued the Indiana attorney and his wife, saying that the couple failed to pay off a $250,000 loan that matured in 2006. Accrued interest had raised the amount owed to over $370,000.

A Cuyahoga County, Ohio trial court did not abuse its discretion when it appointed a receiver for a “defunct” foreign corporation that the trial court found “persists for the purpose of winding up its affairs in Ohio.”In re: All Cases against Sager Corporation (2010), 188 Ohio App 3d 796, appeal accepted for review (2011), 127 Ohio St. 3d 1503. The Court of Appeals found it undisputed that corporate assets existed after the foreign corporation had been dissolved, “and that these assets may afford insurance coverage to Ohioans injured by exposure to Sager’s products”.

On February 7, 2011, in In re DBSD North America, Inc.,1 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit released its opinion joining the Third Circuit in condemning socalled “gifting plans,” thus deepening the perceived circuit split with the First Circuit which has been interpreted as approving of gifting plans. In so doing, the Second Circuit relied on the U.S. Supreme Court cases of Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust & Sav. Ass’n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. P’ship2 and Norwest Bank Worthington v.

On December 23, 2010, the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the 6th Circuit, upheld the Eastern District of Kentucky’s Bankruptcy Court’s order that post petition rents, revenues or other funds derived from leased real property is property of the estate under 11 U.S.C. §541 and can be used as cash collateral under 11 U.S.C. §363. However, post petition rents can be used as cash collateral only if the debtor can provide adequate protection for the use of those rents through an existing equity cushion in the property.

In Ransom v. FIA Card Servs., N.A., --- S.Ct. ----, 2011 WL 66438 (U.S. 2011), the United States Supreme Court took up the question of whether a Chapter 13 debtor who owns his or her vehicle outright (“free and clear”) may claim an allowance for car ownership costs and thereby reduce the amount that he or she will repay creditors. In her first opinion, Justice Kagan answered simply—no. The Ransom opinion has been seen as a victory for not only credit card companies like the one involved but other creditors, as well.

The current "Great Recession," which began in late 2007 with a maelstrom in the debt capital markets, has necessitated a rethinking of the federal income tax rules governing debt restructurings. The harsh rules2 promulgated by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) in reaction to the 1991 taxpayer-favorable decision in Cottage Savings v. Commissioner,3 have been inhibiting restructurings. Instead, rules that did not trigger adverse tax results have been needed to induce lenders and borrowers to restructure obligations that can no longer be paid according to their terms.

The Supreme Court of Kentucky recently held that under Kentucky law, a security interest in a motor vehicle is not deemed perfected unless and until physical notation of the security interest is made on the certificate of title, pursuant to KRS 186A.190.

Late this summer, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, took on an issue of first impression – whether the fraud of one partner can be imputed to an “innocent” partner in order to render a judgment non-dischargeable.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Court recently affirmed a Bankruptcy Appellate Panel that held that a bank which loaned an individual the funds to buy a motor vehicle could not overcome the avoidance of its lien as a preferential transfer after the person filed for bankruptcy. The Court so found because the lien at issue was not perfected under Kentucky law within the time frame necessary to be considered an exception to the avoidance of preferential transfers under the Bankruptcy Code.