The Third Circuit recently held that a bankruptcy court may confirm a Chapter 11 plan that includes a sale of assets in which secured creditors are not permitted to “credit bid” for the assets. In re Philadelphia Newspapers, LLC, 599 F.3d 298 (3d Cir. 2010). In that case, the debtors in possession, companies that own and operate the Philadelphia Inquirer and Philadelphia Daily News, moved the bankruptcy court to approve bid procedures for an auction of the debtors’ assets. Id. at 302.
Two recent rulings have provided significant guidance on the determination of whether an entity is eligible to be a debtor under Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code. On April 26, 2010, the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Nevada issued a decision denying a motion to dismiss the Chapter 11 case of Las Vegas Monorail Company (LVMC) filed by Ambac Assurance Corp. In re Las Vegas Monorail Company (Las Vegas Monorail).
On May 17th, a federal district court denied motions to dismiss a securities fraud lawsuit alleging that defendants failed to disclose adequately their investment in notes issued by a shell company owned by Lehman Brothers, who provided the principal protection guarantee. Defendants' knowledge regarding the notes and Lehman's insolvency contradicted their public statements, satisfying Rule 10b-5's scienter requirements. Plaintiffs also allege that their losses were exaggerated by defendants' lack of disclosure, adequately alleging loss causation.
On May 18th, the Second Circuit, applying the Supreme Court's holding in Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. U.S., 130 S.Ct. 1324 (2010), reversed a trial court order finding that provisions of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act that prohibit debt relief agencies from advising clients to incur more debt were overbroad and unconstitutional when applied to attorneys.
On May 18th, the Second Circuit, addressing the 2005 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code, held that a lender with a purchase-money security interest in a car is entitled to an unsecured claim with regard to a deficiency it incurred upon the surrender and sale of the car. The deficiency claim derives from the contract between the parties and background state law. In the absence of a Bankruptcy Code provision expressly disallowing it, such an unsecured claim may be maintained.
On May 5th, the Senate voted 93-5 to adopt an amendment proposed by Senators Christopher Dodd and Richard Shelby that would give the FDIC authority to liquidate failing financial institutions without the creation of a controversial $50 billion "bailout" fund. Instead, the FDIC would use a new line of credit with the Treasury Department, supported by the assets of the failed institution, to pay the liquidation expenses.
In In re Kohls, 2007 LEXIS 76 (Bankr NDWVa 2007), the debtor filed this adversary proceeding against the Bank to cancel indebtedness and recover damages related to a $34,864 loan that the Bank made to the Debtor on the grounds that the loan was unconscionable at the time it was executed in violation of W. Va. Code § 46A-2-121.
Many bankruptcy practitioners are familiar with the general tenet that an obligation secured only by a mortgage on the Debtor’s principal residence is immune from modification or avoidance by the Debtor. Sections 1123(b)(5) and 1322(b)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code protect residential mortgages from being “stripped-down” to the value of the subject real estate or subjecting the terms of the underlying obligation to modification.
On April 26th, the Eleventh Circuit held that the anti-injunction provision of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act prohibits a federal district court from enjoining the FDIC. A trial court had initially imposed a TRO against a failing bank prohibiting it from taking any action with respect to $1 billion worth of mortgage proceeds it held in trust for petitioner, Bank of America, who held legal title. When the FDIC was appointed receiver, the FDIC moved to dissolve the TRO. The trial court refused converting the TRO into a preliminary injunction.
What should be the remedy when a bankruptcy court holds that a security interest is avoidable as a preferential transfer, but the value of the security interest is not readily ascertainable? The Ninth Circuit recently addressed this issue in USAA Federal Savings Bank v. Thacker (In re: Taylors), 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 5793 (9th Cir. 2010). The Court held that, since the value of the security interest was not readily ascertainable, the only available remedy is for the bankruptcy court to return the security interest itself, not its value, to the bankruptcy estate.