A recent unpublished decision, Strunck v. Figueroa, serves as a not-so-gentle reminder that sometimes an enforcement application can be “too little, too late,” and that it is imperative to be proactive to protect your rights under a divorce decree or agreement, especially when your adversary acts in bad faith. In Strunck, a 2011 divorce decree awarded the plaintiff $23,369, which was to be transferred from the defendant’s retirement account. Before the plaintiff could act to collect the $23,369, however, the defendant withdrew the money from the retirement account.

Because no recent opinions have been published by the Delaware Bankruptcy Court, I wanted to touch on a subject that is vital in nearly every preference or fraudulent transfer case: The Statute of Limitations For A Preference Claim

A. Statute of Limitations

On May 1, 2016, BIND Therapeutics, Inc., and affiliated companies (“Debtors” or “BIND”) voluntarily filed for bankruptcy protection under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.

The filing comes days after the Cambridge, Mass., company received a notice of default from lender Hercules Technology III LP, which demanded immediate payment of the $14.5 million the lender says it is owed under the loan. The Company is backed by Koch Industry Inc.’s David Koch.

– But they weren’t as oppressive as my subject line may imply.

In a 13 page decision, released April 22, 2016, Judge Gross of the Delaware Bankruptcy Court granted a motion to dismiss an adversary proceeding and sanctioned the Plaintiff – disallowing any further litigation against the defendants in the Bankruptcy Court. Judge Gross’ opinion is available here (the “Opinion”).

Recently in the Abengoa SA bankruptcy proceeding (click here to review prior post), the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware entered an order permitting Debtors to reject certain nonresidential real property leases (the “Rejection Order”).

On 29 February 2016, the Insolvency Law Reform Bill 2015 received Royal Assent. The resulting Act, the Insolvency Law Reform Act 2016 (Cth) represents the most significant suite of reforms to Australia’s bankruptcy and corporate insolvency laws in twenty years and is an integral component of the Federal Government’s agenda of improving economic incentives for innovation and entrepreneurialism.

In a decision handed down on 11 February 2016, the High Court has confirmed that the State Supreme Courts have jurisdiction to grant relief to plaintiffs seeking to join insurers of insolvent or potentially insolvent defendants, and a declaration that the insurer is liable to indemnify the defendant. 

Introduction

Tamaya Resources Limited (In Liq) v Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu [2016] FCAFC 2

It is common in large complex cases for plaintiffs to seek to amend their claims during the course of the litigation. A plaintiff may be required to pay the costs thrown away but if its amendment application was brought in good faith and with a proper explanation, it would usually be able to amend its claim.

On 14 July 2015, the South Australian District Court in Matthews v The Tap Inn Pty Ltd [2015] SADC 108 handed down a decision whose underlying reasoning could, if applied by superior courts around Australia, broaden the scope for liquidators to pursue unfair preference claims against secured creditors.

The decision

Based on the current state of judicial consideration of s 548 (1) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (the Act), liquidators cannot be certain that a committee of inspection (COI) established at a general meeting of creditors alone is valid with the consequence that liquidators may be concerned about their reliance on past and future COI approvals to draw remuneration and take other steps in the winding up.

Re: the Bell Group Ltd (In Liquidation)