A recent unpublished decision, Strunck v. Figueroa, serves as a not-so-gentle reminder that sometimes an enforcement application can be “too little, too late,” and that it is imperative to be proactive to protect your rights under a divorce decree or agreement, especially when your adversary acts in bad faith. In Strunck, a 2011 divorce decree awarded the plaintiff $23,369, which was to be transferred from the defendant’s retirement account. Before the plaintiff could act to collect the $23,369, however, the defendant withdrew the money from the retirement account.
Because no recent opinions have been published by the Delaware Bankruptcy Court, I wanted to touch on a subject that is vital in nearly every preference or fraudulent transfer case: The Statute of Limitations For A Preference Claim
A. Statute of Limitations
On May 1, 2016, BIND Therapeutics, Inc., and affiliated companies (“Debtors” or “BIND”) voluntarily filed for bankruptcy protection under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.
The filing comes days after the Cambridge, Mass., company received a notice of default from lender Hercules Technology III LP, which demanded immediate payment of the $14.5 million the lender says it is owed under the loan. The Company is backed by Koch Industry Inc.’s David Koch.
– But they weren’t as oppressive as my subject line may imply.
In a 13 page decision, released April 22, 2016, Judge Gross of the Delaware Bankruptcy Court granted a motion to dismiss an adversary proceeding and sanctioned the Plaintiff – disallowing any further litigation against the defendants in the Bankruptcy Court. Judge Gross’ opinion is available here (the “Opinion”).
Recently in the Abengoa SA bankruptcy proceeding (click here to review prior post), the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware entered an order permitting Debtors to reject certain nonresidential real property leases (the “Rejection Order”).
Decision establishes framework for future rulings that covenants in midstream agreements do not run with the land.
On February 17, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) proposed a joint rule that would govern the resolution of large broker-dealers that are designated as “covered financial companies” under the Orderly Liquidation Authority (OLA) provisions (Title II) of the Dodd-Frank Act.
Most companies do not own all of the intellectual property (IP) rights that their businesses rely on. It is not uncommon for some portion of a company’s IP rights to be in-licensed from other persons or entities under a license agreement. In such cases, the licensee has contractual rights to use the IP that is the subject of an in-license but not full ownership of such IP. In the day-to-day operations of a company, the distinction between owned IP rights and in-licensed IP rights can easily get lost.
The Court of Chancery issues a liberal ruling on creditor derivative standing and more obsequies for the “zone of insolvency.”
It is trite to observe that issues related to the insolvency of a company are not arbitrable. However, the generality of this broad proposition can be misleading. In this the first of two articles on the arbitrability of claims, we look at how a court may approach a winding up petition in the face of a claim that the purported debt on which the petition is based relates to a dispute that is to be arbitrated.