Fulltext Search

The law allows any person to be treated as a director even though that person has not been formally appointed as a director. Such directors are known as de-facto directors. By contrast, a de jure director is a person who has been validly appointed as a director.

The recent case of Re Snelling House Ltd (In Liquidation) [2012] EWHC 440 (Ch) serves as a useful reminder to consider possible claims against de-facto directors who may be acting under the wrong impression that they are beyond reprehension.

The facts

On May 25, 2012, Residential Capital LLC (“ResCap”) filed a complaint in United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to extend the automatic stay over 27 MBS lawsuits against it, its affiliates, and its executives while it undergoes bankruptcy restructuring.  ResCap alleges that all of the lawsuits against its non-debtor affiliates are inextricably connected to the debtor affiliates, and that such lawsuits will drain the debtors’ estates by forcing those entities to undergo extensive discovery and face significant indem

The long awaited judgment in The Commissioners for her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs v. Football League Limited, on the so called “football creditors’ rule” (the “Rule”) has been given.

This article only concerns itself with the issue of whether the Rule was or was not considered void on the grounds that it was contrary to the pari passu principle and the anti-deprivation rule and not on the fairness of the Rule itself.

On May 29, 2012, the United States Supreme Court issued its much-anticipated decision in the Chapter 11 bankruptcy cases for RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC and its affiliate (together, the “Debtors”). The Court held that when a debtor proposes to sell a secured creditor’s collateral free and clear of the creditor’s lien pursuant to a Chapter 11 bankruptcy plan, the debtor cannot deny the creditor the opportunity to “credit bid” in the sale without cause.

The bankruptcy case of TOUSA, Inc. and its various subsidiaries (collectively “Tousa”) is one where lenders have seen their fortunes rise and fall. On March 15, 2012, they fell again when the Eleventh Circuit1 (the “Circuit Court”) reversed the District Court’s opinion and reinstated the Bankruptcy Court’s order, which had disgorged over $400 million from Tousa’s senior lenders and avoided certain guarantees and liens granted to them by the Conveying Subsidiaries (defined below).

It is looking increasingly likely that 2012 will be another difficult year for the automotive sector, leading to a decline, not only in vehicle sales, but also in goods and services supplied to the sector. As a result, businesses may experience cash flow problems and increased creditor pressure to pay invoices.

We previously reported on Raithatha v Williamson (4 April 2012) where the High Court held that a bankrupt’s right to draw a pension was subject to an income payments order (“IPO”) even if the individual had yet to draw his pension. This judgment represented a significant departure from previous practice under the Welfare Reform and Pensions Act 1999 which protected future pension rights from IPOs and distinguished them from pensions in payment. It also effectively allowed a trustee in bankruptcy to compel a bankrupt to draw pension against his wishes.

The EU insolvency law has resulted in insolvent debtors shopping for a better jurisdiction in which to become bankrupt.  This article examines why and how.

Why?

The EC Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings 2000 (the ECIR), came into effect in May 2002, providing a framework for the national jurisdictions to work together by recognition of each states insolvency mechanisms.  However the EC Regulation does not harmonise substantive differences in insolvency law between the subscribing nations.