A Cuyahoga County, Ohio trial court did not abuse its discretion when it appointed a receiver for a “defunct” foreign corporation that the trial court found “persists for the purpose of winding up its affairs in Ohio.”In re: All Cases against Sager Corporation (2010), 188 Ohio App 3d 796, appeal accepted for review (2011), 127 Ohio St. 3d 1503. The Court of Appeals found it undisputed that corporate assets existed after the foreign corporation had been dissolved, “and that these assets may afford insurance coverage to Ohioans injured by exposure to Sager’s products”.
On February 16, 2011, the Third Circuit affirmed a Delaware bankruptcy court's order determining the value of mortgage loans in the context of a 2006 repurchase agreement. Buyer Calyon argued that the mortgage loan portfolio sold to it by American Home Mortgage had a market price of only $670 million, as compared to its $1.15 billion contractual repurchase price, and that American Home Mortgage was required to pay Calyon the $480 million difference under a repo agreement.
On December 23, 2010, the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the 6th Circuit, upheld the Eastern District of Kentucky’s Bankruptcy Court’s order that post petition rents, revenues or other funds derived from leased real property is property of the estate under 11 U.S.C. §541 and can be used as cash collateral under 11 U.S.C. §363. However, post petition rents can be used as cash collateral only if the debtor can provide adequate protection for the use of those rents through an existing equity cushion in the property.
In Ransom v. FIA Card Servs., N.A., --- S.Ct. ----, 2011 WL 66438 (U.S. 2011), the United States Supreme Court took up the question of whether a Chapter 13 debtor who owns his or her vehicle outright (“free and clear”) may claim an allowance for car ownership costs and thereby reduce the amount that he or she will repay creditors. In her first opinion, Justice Kagan answered simply—no. The Ransom opinion has been seen as a victory for not only credit card companies like the one involved but other creditors, as well.
On December 21, ISDA announced that it sought and was granted permission to intervene in the Lehman Brothers International Europe case in order to ensure that the arguments reflecting the market's interpretation of Section 2(a)(iii) of the ISDA Master Agreement were made before the court. The court agreed with ISDA that Section 2(a)(iii) is "suspensive" in effect. ISDA Release.
On December 29, 2010, the Honorable Mariana R. Pfaelzer denied a motion by Stichting Pensioenfonds ABP ("Plaintiff") to remand its claims against Countrywide and others to state court. Judge Pfaelzer concluded that the case was sufficiently related to a bankruptcy case to confer federal jurisdiction in light of contractual indemnification obligations of a bankrupt originator, American Home Mortgage Corp., to Countrywide. The Court also concluded that there were no equitable grounds meriting remand.
The Supreme Court of Kentucky recently held that under Kentucky law, a security interest in a motor vehicle is not deemed perfected unless and until physical notation of the security interest is made on the certificate of title, pursuant to KRS 186A.190.
On November 17th, Lehman Brothers Special Financing Inc. ("LBSF") and its official unsecured creditors' committee filed a joint motion to stay BNY Corporate Trustee Services Limited's ("BNY") appeal for 90 days in the "Dante" matter, pending final settlement of the dispute between LBSF and Perpetual Trustee Company Limited ("Perpetual").
Late this summer, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, took on an issue of first impression – whether the fraud of one partner can be imputed to an “innocent” partner in order to render a judgment non-dischargeable.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Court recently affirmed a Bankruptcy Appellate Panel that held that a bank which loaned an individual the funds to buy a motor vehicle could not overcome the avoidance of its lien as a preferential transfer after the person filed for bankruptcy. The Court so found because the lien at issue was not perfected under Kentucky law within the time frame necessary to be considered an exception to the avoidance of preferential transfers under the Bankruptcy Code.