Introduction
On 22 February 2022, Doyle J made a winding up order and appointed joint official liquidators in respect of GTI Holdings Limited (Company), a company incorporated in the Cayman Islands. The winding up order was unopposed and Doyle J was satisfied that the company was insolvent. Nevertheless, in a judgment dated 15 March 2022, Doyle J articulated the reasons for his hesitancy in making that winding up order.
Background
In the recent decision of Re Formation (Cayman) Fund I, L.P (unreported, 21 April 2022), Justice Kawaley held (notwithstanding the earlier decision of Justice Parker in Re Padma Fund L.P. (unreported, 8 October 2021) in respect of a creditor's petition) that a limited partner may petition to wind up an exempted limited partnership (ELP) on the just and equitable ground by presenting a petition against the ELP directly (rather than against the general partner), and that an ELP may be wound-up in the same manner as a company pursuant to Part V of the Compani
Introduction
The current geo-political climate is contributing to the rapid rise to inflation rates in many countries around the world. Governments have reacted with an inevitable increase to interest rates to try and offer some form of counterbalance to rising costs in an effort to stymy localised, and more widespread, economic recessions.
The Cayman Islands Court of Appeal has recently delivered helpful clarification on the principles which apply with respect to security for costs when the official liquidators of an insolvent fund seek to bring claims against its former management. Where it is clear to the Court that a defendant was responsible for management decisions immediately before a company entered insolvency, the Court may exercise its discretion, notwithstanding the impecuniosity of the plaintiff company, not to order payment of security for costs.
This article was originally published by ThoughtLeaders4 FIRE.
Introduction
There was a distinct air of positivity and delight to be out and about networking again at the FIRE Starters Global Summit in Dublin. Once again the event was well attended by a wonderful and dynamic group of international professionals from across the advisory spectrum in asset recovery, fraud and insolvency and many new networks were forged over the fun three-day event.
How should liquidators deal with the administrative burden of adjudicating thousands of low-value proof of debts in a liquidation estate, without exhausting the limited assets available in the liquidation estate? The Grand Court of the Cayman Islands recently approved a pragmatic solution.
How should liquidators deal with the administrative burden of adjudicating thousands of low-value proof of debts in a liquidation estate, without exhausting the limited assets available in the liquidation estate? The Grand Court recently sanctioned a pragmatic solution.
Introduction
This article first appeared in FIRE magazine.
Introduction
根据测算，截止2022年年初，国内烂尾项目规模已经超过2万亿，随着2021年大型房地产公司接连“暴雷”，势必会产生更多的烂尾或接近烂尾的项目。对于商业逻辑自洽的单体项目破产重组，借助破产清算或重整程序分兵突围势必成为地方政府主导重整的最优路径。但是鉴于目前的房地产市场行情以及烂尾项目续建的特点，大部分重整投资人，尤其是财务投资类型的重整投资人更倾向于采用固定收益的方式进行项目重整，既能实现维护稳定的社会效果，又能最大限度地保证投资安全。因此，如何在当前法律架构下保障固定收益重整投资人的利益是本文中讨论的主要问题。
一 重整投资人的收益模式对比
重整投资人参与烂尾项目的收益模式大致可以分为固定收益模式、风险收益模式和固定加风险收益模式。不同的收益模式下重整投资人有不同的投资逻辑，也有不同的退出模式。我们从投入、收益、风险以及安全性角度对固定收益模式与风险收益模式进行了比较。
（一）固定收益模式
固定收益模式的特点是重整投资人投入重整资金，约定固定收益率，在最终财产变现所得中优先收回投资本金及收益，项目剩余资产全部用于债权清偿。
根据全国人大常委会执法检查组关于检查企业破产法实施情况的报告，党的十八大以来，随着供给侧结构性改革持续深化，加快建立和完善市场主体挽救和退出机制，加之新冠肺炎疫情对于宏观经济运行的深刻影响，我国企业破产案件数量快速上升，2017年至2020年受理和审结的破产案件分别占到《企业破产法》实施以来案件总量的54%和41%。[1]区别于传统的中小企业破产重整，大型或超大型企业集团的资产结构复杂、债务规模巨大、历史遗留问题众多，进入破产重整程序之后，如何在《企业破产法》的框架下实现资产重组与债务清偿、持续运营与杠杆处置、重整效率与债权人保护等多重利益关系的合理平衡，成为破产实务中的难点与痛点。随着2021年B集团实质合并重整案（以下简称“B集团重整案”）和海航集团等三百二十一家公司实质合并重整案（以下简称“海航集团重整案”）中信托计划的引入，破产重整程序中引入信托计划作为新型破产重整模式引起业界关注。本文将结合笔者在破产重整程序中设立信托计划的服务经验，简要介绍破产重整程序中信托计划定位与架构、信托机制与破产重整程序的衔接等相关实务难点问题，以供参考。
一. 破产重整程序中信托计划的概念和优势