The test for granting leave to appeal in Companies Creditors’ Arrangement Act proceedings is well-settled:

Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code provides a procedure to obtain recognition in the United States of a "foreign proceeding," which includes a foreign bankruptcy, insolvency, liquidation, or

On June 26, 2013, US Bankruptcy Judge Martin Glenn, overseeing the chapter 11 case of Residential Capital, LLC (ResCap), unsealed a 1,900-page report produced by court-appointed examiner, Arthur J. Gonzalez, and his professionals, Chadbourne & Parke LLP and Mesirow Financial Consulting, LLC. The Examiner Report was the culmination of a ten-month investigation that identified amyriad of causes of action, potentially worth billions of dollars, arising fromdozens of transactions involving ResCap's parent, Ally Financial Inc., its subsidiary Ally Bank, and Cerberus.

In Kasten Energy Inc. v. Shamrock Oil & Gas Ltd., 2013 ABQB 63, the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench considered the application of Kasten Energy Inc. (“Kasten”) to appoint a receiver over all of the assets and undertakings of Shamrock Oil & Gas Ltd. (“Shamrock”). The decision in this case presents a useful and concise summary of the applicable test for the appointment of a receiver.  

Over the last several years, the number of Chapter 15 filings has continued to grow. One of the most prominent of these bankruptcy filings is the Vitro S.A.B. de C.V. case. When last we reported on theVitro case, the Texas bankruptcy court administering the Chapter 15 case had denied recognition to the Mexican restructuring plan of Vitro because the plan provided third party releases to non-debtors. See Vitro, S.A.B.: Bankruptcy Court Refuses to Recognize Mexican Concurso That Releases Claims Against Non-Debtors” (November 2012).

Last Fall, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit issued a decision in the Charter Communications bankruptcy case which will create additional significant challenges for those seeking to appeal confirmation of plans of reorganization that have been implemented. See 691 F.3d 476. Upon implementation (or “substantial consummation”) of the plan, the Second Circuit presumes that the appeal of such plan is equitably moot. Appellants bear the burden of overcoming that presumption.

When does the selection of a technically correct venue become “unjust”? This was the core question Judge Shelley Chapman was required to grapple with when Patriot Coal and almost 100 of its affiliates filed for bankruptcy in New York this past summer. Should it matter that Patriot Coal created the New York subsidiaries, that permitted a New York court filing, about a month prior to the actual bankruptcy filing?

In Sunbeam Products, Inc. v. Chicago American Manufacturing, LLC, 686 F.3d 372, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that a debtor-licensor’s rejection of an executory trademark license does not terminate the licensee’s right to use the trademark. The decision creates a circuit-level split that may invite Supreme Court review. However, no final resolution is likely soon. The Supreme Court declined to hear the case, denying a petition for a writ of certiorari in December of 2012.

“When a business becomes insolvent, many interests are at risk.  Creditors may not be able to recover their debts, investors may lose their investments and employees may lose their jobs. If the business is the sponsor of an employee pension plan, the benefits promised by the plan are not immune from that risk. The circumstances leading to these appeals show how that risk can materialize. Pension plans and creditors find themselves in a zero-sum game with not enough money to go around.

On Friday, February 1, 2013, the Supreme Court of Canada released its highly anticipated decision in Indalex Limited (Re).  The ruling stemmed from an appeal of an Ontario Court of Appeal decision that had created commercial uncertainty for financing transactions.  The primary issue for lenders was a priority dispute between a court ordered super-priority charge granted to a lender that had provided “debtor-in-possession” (DIP) financing under the Compan