In a departure from other bankruptcy courts in the Third Circuit and her own recent prior opinion, U.S. Bankruptcy Chief Judge Mary France of the Middle District of Pennsylvania broadly interpreted the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 2 (2011), and held that a bankruptcy court lacks the constitutional authority to issue a final judgment in any fraudulent transfer action where the defendant (i) has not filed a proof of claim and (ii) has not consented to the bankruptcy judge entering a final judgment on the matter.
124 members of the Element Six pension scheme are suing the trustees of the scheme in the Commercial Court for alleged breach of duty arising out of the decision to close the scheme with a significant deficit. The members claim that the trustees breached their duty to the members by failing to demand that the employer fully fund the deficit in the scheme before wind up. A number of general issues relating to the obligations of trustees were raised during the 3-week hearing of the case.
Background
The Bankruptcy Code provides debtors in possession and other potential plan proponents with considerable flexibility to implement a plan under chapter 11. An important consideration is the preservation of potentially valuable causes of action held by the estate and the provision of a vehicle for post-confirmation prosecution of such claims.
The Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida recently issued an important decision for administrative creditors in chapter 11 cases and chapter 7 cases alike. In In re National Litho, LLC, 2013 WL 2303786 (Bankr. S.D. Fla.
Section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code provides a “safe harbor” for certain transfers involving the purchase and sale of securities and protects those transfers from avoidance in bankruptcy proceedings as preferences or constructively fraudulent conveyances. Specifically, section 546(e) insulates transfers that are “settlement payments” used in the securities trade, as well as other transfers made to or from certain parties, including financial institutions, financial participants and stockbrokers, in connection with a securities contract. Section 741(8) of the Bankruptcy Code de
In a recent decision, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit shocked observers by holding that bankruptcy courts have the power to recharacterize claims on account of unpaid debts as equity infusions that cannot be repaid until all creditor claims have been satisfied. In In re Fitness Holdings Int’l, Inc., 714 F.3d 1141 (9th Cir.
Section 548 of the Bankruptcy Code provides that a transfer made within two years of a bankruptcy filing is fraudulent if the debtor received less than “reasonably equivalent value” in exchange for the transfer and (i) the transfer rendered the debtor insolvent or was made at a time that the debtor was already insolvent or; (ii) the debtor had an unreasonably small amount of capital; or (iii) the debtor intended to incur, or believed that it would incur, debts that it would be unable to pay as they matured. The fraudulent transfer laws of most states, made applicable in bankruptcy pro
It isn't law yet, but on December 5, 2013, the U.S. House of Representatives passed a significant patent reform bill known as the "Innovation Act." Although the focus of the legislation is on patent infringement litigation and other patent law revisions, the Innovation Act, H.R. 3309, would also make major changes to Section 365(n) of the Bankruptcy Code.
My how time flies in protracted bankruptcy litigation. More than four years ago, as I reported back at the time, the Bankruptcy Court in the Chapter 15 cross-border bankruptcy case of Qimonda AG issued its first decision on the application of Section 365(n) in that case. After an initial appeal, a four-day trial on remand, and another appeal, last week the U.S.
Borrowers are increasingly seeking to challenge or frustrate the validity of an appointment of a receiver on technical grounds. While each case will be determined on its own merits and facts, a recent decision of the High Court is illustrative of the Court’s attitude towards some such arguments.