Few things go together as naturally as fraud and insolvency. The pattern is now well rehearsed: scams pile up unnoticed while money flows in the good times, but when recession hits, increased scrutiny from lenders, counterparties and the tax man – not to mention insolvency practitioners – means fraud is far more likely to be discovered.

After last year’s significant reforms to Australia’s insolvency framework, the Government has demonstrated a further commitment to simplifying and streamlining insolvency law to allow viable businesses that encounter economic challenges to restructure and continue trading.

This commitment is demonstrated by the Government continuing to examine ways to improve Australia's insolvency laws, including consulting on options to:

Introduction

The recent decision by the Hong Kong* court in Re Ando Credit Ltd [2020] HKCFI 2775 marks its first appointment of provisional liquidators[1] over a Hong Kong company with the express purpose of allowing the liquidators to seek recognition in China Mainland.

引言

香港法院最近在Re Ando Credit Ltd [2020] HKCFI 2775一案中，首次批准一家香港公司任命临时清盘人[1]，并明确旨在允许该临时清盘人向中国内地法院寻求内地法律的承认和执行。

引言

香港法院最近在Re Ando Credit Ltd [2020] HKCFI 2775一案中，首次批准一家香港公司任命临时清盘人[1]，并明确旨在允许该临时清盘人向中国内地法院寻求内地法律的承认和执行。

The Covid-19 pandemic has had a severe impact on the economy. This has given rise to an increasing number of claimants with claims against insolvent businesses.

In these circumstances, a third-party claimant would usually notify the company’s insolvency practitioner of its claim. The claimant is then required to pursue its recovery as part of the insolvency process alongside other creditors.

The Third Parties (Rights Against Insurers) Act 2010 (the 2010 Act)¹

The UK’s new “restructuring plan” was enacted in June 2020.¹ This highly-anticipated regime introduced (for the first time into English law) a tongue twisting “cross-class cram down” (CCCD) mechanism by which a restructuring plan can (at the court’s discretion) be imposed on an entire class of dissenting creditors or members.

Until recently, only two companies had successfully used the restructuring plan regime.² In both instances, CCCD was not considered as the required voting thresholds (i.e. 75%) were met.

对于《最高人民法院关于适用〈中华人民共和国民法典〉有关担保制度的解释》（下称“《民法典担保解释》”或“新规”）对金融资管业务的影响，我们在上篇及中篇中从担保物权受托持有、增信文件性质、上市公司对外担保、担保物权登记、抵押预告登记等角度进行了详细探析。本篇我们将从资产收益权回购交易、仲裁与申请实现担保物权程序、担保与破产衔接角度，着重介绍新规的修订及对金融资管业务的影响。择重点概括如下：

一、新规明确特定资产或资产收益权转让及回购交易中让与担保规则的处理方法

引言：近期某集团破产清算案中，关于债务人与境外基金债权人之间因“维好协议”引发的纠纷事项，上海金融法院作出裁定，对境外债权人在香港特别行政区取得的对该债务人的胜诉判决予以认可，鉴此该境外债权人的债权有望在破产程序中获得确认。而其他破产案件中，管理人对境外投资人基于“维好协议”的债权作出不予确认的决定。由此，关于“维好协议”项下的债权人应如何主张权利、在“维好提供方”破产的情况下可否享有破产债权人地位并参与破产程序等问题众说纷纭。为此，本文将从“维好协议”的性质入手，在境内“维好提供方”破产语境下，阐述“维好协议”项下债权人可以主张权利的路径，并分析各救济途径在司法实践中的可行性。

一、“维好协议”的性质分析

（一）何谓“维好协议”

Background