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In Australia, s 436A of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (Act) provides for the circumstances in which a company may appoint a voluntary administrator. This provision requires the company’s board to resolve that: (a) in the opinion of the directors voting for the resolution, the company is insolvent, or is likely to become insolvent at some future time; and (b) an administrator of the company should be appointed.

Voluntary administration is Australia’s primary business rescue regime. This article is Part 2 of a two-part series. In this article, we highlight the impact of voluntary administration on various stakeholders and the potential outcomes for a company in voluntary administration. It is not intended to be used as an exhaustive guide to Australia’s voluntary administration regime and its many nuances.

Voluntary administration is Australia’s primary business rescue regime. This article is Part 1 of a two-part series. This article provides an introductory overview of voluntary administration in Australia, explaining what it is, why entities might enter it and its processes. It is not intended to be used as an exhaustive guide to Australia’s voluntary administration regime and its many nuances.

In a recent decision, a district court reversed the decision of the bankruptcy court and clarified the independent obligation of the Bankruptcy Court to ensure that a Chapter 13 Plan satisfies the necessary requirements of the Bankruptcy Code, irrespective of the parties’ conduct.  In re: BRUCE D. PERRY, Debtor. KRISTA PREUSS, Standing Chapter 13 Tr., SDNY, Appellant, v. BRUCE D. PERRY, Appellee., No. 20-CV-4617 (CS), 2021 WL 4298192 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 21, 2021)

In Australia, public companies are required to have at least three directors (s 201A(2) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (Act)). However, in exceptional circumstances, a public company might find itself with fewer than three directors – for example, where the other board directors resign because of some disagreement.

Earlier this month – citing the “virtually unflagging obligation” of an Article III appellate court to exercise its subject matter jurisdiction – the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals decried the pervasive overreliance by district courts on the doctrine “equitable mootness” to duck appeals of confirmation orders.[1]

The peak indebtedness rule employed by liquidators to maximise recovery of unfair preference claims is abolished

Judge Stacey Jernigan did not mince words in a recent opinion sanctioning the former CEO of Highland Capital Management, LP. Entities related to the former CEO brought suit against Highland (the debtor in a Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding), and sought leave from the district court to add Highland’s replacement CEO as a defendant. In Judge Jernigan’s view, such conduct violated her “gatekeeping” orders that required the bankruptcy court’s approval before “pursuing” actions against the new CEO.

A key goal of the Bankruptcy Code is to prevent corporate insiders from profiting from their employer’s misfortune. Section 503(c) of the Code makes clear: “there shall neither be allowed, nor paid... a transfer made to, or an obligation incurred for the benefit of, an insider of the debtor for the purpose of inducing such person to remain with the debtor's business” absent certain court-approved circumstances.

Some courts permit debtors to designate vendors crucial to their business as “critical vendors.” These vendors supply debtors with necessary goods or services. Debtors are permitted to pay them amounts owing when a bankruptcy case is filed. Accordingly, critical vendors often recover more on their pre-petition claims than other unsecured creditors. In other words, critical vendors could receive a full recovery, while other creditors only receive a fraction of what they are owed.