We have blogged previously about the intersection of fraud and bankruptcy.

In Harrington v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 144 S. Ct. 2071 (2024) (“Purdue”), the Supreme Court held that the Bankruptcy Code does not authorize nonconsensual releases of nondebtors as part of a chapter 11 plan. The Court narrowly read the Code’s language, providing that a plan may “include any other appropriate provision not inconsistent with the applicable provisions of this title,” 11 U.S.C.

On July 2, 2024, the Court of Appeal for British Columbia (the “Court”) released its highly anticipated decision in British Columbia v. Peakhill Capital Inc., 2024 BCCA 246 (“Peakhill”) concerning the use of reverse vesting orders (“RVOs”) to effect sale transactions structured to avoid provincial property transfer taxes for the benefit of creditors.

The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council has decisively redrawn the boundaries between arbitration agreements and insolvency proceedings in the case of Sian Participation Corp (In Liquidation) v Halimeda International Ltd.[1]

Many litigators and corporate lawyers view the practice of representing a large shareholder and the company in which it is invested as common practice. In many instances, no conflict of interest will ever materialize such that the shareholder and the company require separate representation. However, in a recent opinion rendered by the United States Bankruptcy Court, Eastern District of Virginia (the “Court”), a large international law firm (the “Firm”) was disqualified from representing Enviva Inc.

Insolvenzanträge von namhaften Projektentwicklern und Immobiliengesellschaften stellen die betroffenen Unternehmen und ihre Gläubiger vor große Herausforderungen und setzen die gesamte Immobilienbranche unter Druck. Gleichzeitig gewinnen alternative Restrukturierungsmethoden, die außerhalb oder bereits im Vorfeld eines formalen Insolvenzverfahrens stattfinden, zunehmend an Bedeutung.

Vor diesem Hintergrund fällt auch vermehrt das Stichwort “StaRUG“, wenn es um die Restrukturierung von immobilienhaltenden Gesellschaften geht.

This article originally appeared in The Bankruptcy Strategist.

To file bankruptcy in the U.S., a debtor must reside in, have a domicile or a place of business in, or have property in the United States. 11 U.S.C. §109(a). In cross border Chapter 15 cases, courts have considered if a foreign debtor must satisfy that jurisdictional test.

2275518 Ontario Inc. v. The Toronto-Dominion Bank, 2024 ONCA 343

On May 6, 2024, the Ontario Court of Appeal upheld a summary judgment motion decision in favour of The Toronto-Dominion Bank (“TD Bank”) in 2275518 Ontario Inc. v. The Toronto-Dominion Bank, 2024 ONCA 343.^[1]

At a hearing in mid-March, the Delaware bankruptcy court held Camshaft Capital Fund, LP, Camshaft Capital Advisors, LLC, Camshaft Capital Management (collectively, “Camshaft”) and William Cameron Morton, principal of Camshaft, in civil contempt. The case is noteworthy because the court not only imposed monetary sanctions but also ordered civil confinement to compel Camshaft and Morton to comply with the court’s prior discovery order. The court issued a supplementary opinion on April 3, 2024, after Camshaft appealed.

To file bankruptcy in the U.S., a debtor must reside in, have a domicile or a place of business in, or have property in the United States. 11 U.S.C. § 109(a). In cross border chapter 15 cases, courts have considered whether a representative of a foreign debtor must satisfy that jurisdictional test.