We have blogged previously about the intersection of fraud and bankruptcy.

In Harrington v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 144 S. Ct. 2071 (2024) (“Purdue”), the Supreme Court held that the Bankruptcy Code does not authorize nonconsensual releases of nondebtors as part of a chapter 11 plan. The Court narrowly read the Code’s language, providing that a plan may “include any other appropriate provision not inconsistent with the applicable provisions of this title,” 11 U.S.C.

The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council has decisively redrawn the boundaries between arbitration agreements and insolvency proceedings in the case of Sian Participation Corp (In Liquidation) v Halimeda International Ltd.[1]

On June 27, 2024, the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in Harrington v. Purdue Pharma LP, addressing the question of whether a company can use bankruptcy to resolve the liability of non-debtor third parties. The Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, held that the bankruptcy code does not authorize a release and an injunction that, as part of a plan of reorganization under Chapter 11, effectively seek to discharge the claims against a nondebtor without the consent of the affected claimants.

On June 27, 2024, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Harrington v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 603 U.S. ____ (2024) holding that the Bankruptcy Code does not allow for the inclusion of non-consensual third-party releases in chapter 11 plans. This decision settles a long-standing circuit split on the propriety of such releases and clarifies that a plan may not provide for the release of claims against non-debtors without the consent of the claimants.

Insolvenzanträge von namhaften Projektentwicklern und Immobiliengesellschaften stellen die betroffenen Unternehmen und ihre Gläubiger vor große Herausforderungen und setzen die gesamte Immobilienbranche unter Druck. Gleichzeitig gewinnen alternative Restrukturierungsmethoden, die außerhalb oder bereits im Vorfeld eines formalen Insolvenzverfahrens stattfinden, zunehmend an Bedeutung.

Vor diesem Hintergrund fällt auch vermehrt das Stichwort “StaRUG“, wenn es um die Restrukturierung von immobilienhaltenden Gesellschaften geht.

This article originally appeared in The Bankruptcy Strategist.

To file bankruptcy in the U.S., a debtor must reside in, have a domicile or a place of business in, or have property in the United States. 11 U.S.C. §109(a). In cross border Chapter 15 cases, courts have considered if a foreign debtor must satisfy that jurisdictional test.

At a hearing in mid-March, the Delaware bankruptcy court held Camshaft Capital Fund, LP, Camshaft Capital Advisors, LLC, Camshaft Capital Management (collectively, “Camshaft”) and William Cameron Morton, principal of Camshaft, in civil contempt. The case is noteworthy because the court not only imposed monetary sanctions but also ordered civil confinement to compel Camshaft and Morton to comply with the court’s prior discovery order. The court issued a supplementary opinion on April 3, 2024, after Camshaft appealed.

To file bankruptcy in the U.S., a debtor must reside in, have a domicile or a place of business in, or have property in the United States. 11 U.S.C. § 109(a). In cross border chapter 15 cases, courts have considered whether a representative of a foreign debtor must satisfy that jurisdictional test.

We have previouslyblogged about the section 546(e) defense to a trustee’s avoidance powers under the Bankruptcy Code. A trustee has broad powers to set aside certain transfers made by debtors before bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 547, 548.