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On February 1, 2017, the Supreme Court of Singapore and the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware announced that they had formally implemented Guidelines for Communication and Cooperation between Courts in Cross-Border Insolvency Matters (the "Guidelines"). The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York adopted the Guidelines on February 17, 2017.

Restructuring an international group of companies in Europe continues to be challenging. While companies can transact business freely across European borders, coordination between the stakeholders involved in a cross-border restructuring has proved to be difficult. The cross-border restructuring of a corporate group is often complicated by a multitude of individual liquidation proceedings spread throughout the various countries in which the group is active.

Bankruptcy headlines in 2007 were awash with tidings of controversial developments in the chapter 11 cases of Northwest Airlines and its affiliates that sent shock waves through the "distressed" investment community. A New York bankruptcy court ruled that an unofficial, or "ad hoc," committee consisting of hedge funds and other distressed investment entities holding Northwest stock and claims was obligated under a formerly obscure provision in the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure—Rule 2019—to disclose the details of its members' trading positions, including the acquisition prices.

The solicitation of creditor votes on a plan is a crucial part of the chapter 11 process. At a minimum, a chapter 11 plan can be confirmed only if at least one class of impaired creditors (or interest holders) votes to accept the plan. A plan proponent’s efforts to solicit an adequate number of plan acceptances, however, may be complicated if creditors or other enfranchised stakeholders neglect (or choose not) to vote.

One of the hallmarks of chapter 11, and bankruptcy jurisprudence in general in the U.S., is the fundamental right of creditors and other stakeholders to have a meaningful voice in the proceedings concerning matters that affect their economic interests.

Principles of corporate governance that determine how a company functions outside of bankruptcy are transformed and in some cases abrogated once the company files for chapter 11 protection, when the debtor's board and management act as a "debtor-in-possession" ("DIP") that bears fiduciary obligations to the chapter 11 estate and all stakeholders involved in the bankruptcy case.

In a significant Delaware law decision regarding creditors’ ability to sue corporate fiduciaries, the Delaware Supreme Court recently addressed the issue of whether a corporate director owes fiduciary duties to the creditors of a company that is insolvent or in the “zone of insolvency.” In North American Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, the court concluded that directors of a solvent Delaware corporation that is operating in the zone of insolvency owe their fiduciary duties to the corporation and its shareholders, and not creditors.

The strategic importance of classifying claims and interests under a chapter 11 plan is sometimes an invitation for creative machinations designed to muster adequate support for confirmation of the plan. Although the Bankruptcy Code unequivocally states that only “substantially similar” claims or interests can be classified together, it neither defines “substantial similarity” nor requires that all claims or interests fitting the description be classified together.