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The court-fashioned doctrine of "equitable mootness" has frequently been applied to bar appeals of bankruptcy court orders under circumstances where reversal or modification of an order could jeopardize, for example, the implementation of a negotiated chapter 11 plan or related agreements and upset the expectations of third parties who have relied on the order.

Section 365(h) of the Bankruptcy Code provides special protection for tenants if a trustee or chapter 11 debtor-in-possession ("DIP") rejects an unexpired lease under which the debtor was the lessor by giving the tenant the option of retaining possession of the leased premises. Although the provision clearly describes what rights a tenant has if it makes such an election, it does not unequivocally address the extent of the electing tenant's obligations under the rejected lease or any related agreements. The U.S.

In Short

The Situation: In In re MPM Silicones, L.L.C., secured noteholders argued that replacement notes distributed to them under a cram-down chapter 11 plan should bear market-rate interest rather than the lower formula rate proposed in the plan and that they were entitled to a make-whole premium.

Debtors beware: The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has recently expanded the ability of parties to appeal a bankruptcy court's approval of a sale of assets notwithstanding the statutory mootness rule set forth in section 363(m) of the Bankruptcy Code.

On July 26, 2016, a three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit ruled that the Bankruptcy Code section 546(e) "safe harbor" applicable to constructive fraudulent transfers that are settlement payments made in connection with securities contracts does not protect "transfers that are simply conducted through financial institutions (or the other entities named in section 546(e)), where the entity is neither the debtor nor the transferee but only the conduit."FTI Consulting, Inc. v. Merit Management Group, LP, 2016 BL 243677.

One of the prerequisites to confirmation of any chapter 11 plan is that at least one “impaired” class of creditors must vote in favor of the plan. This requirement reflects the basic (but not universally accepted) principle that a plan may not be imposed on a dissident body of stakeholders of which no class has given approval. However, it is sometimes an invitation to creative machinations designed to muster the requisite votes for confirmation of the plan.

The ability of a bankruptcy court to reorder the priority of claims or interests by means of equitable subordination or recharacterization of debt as equity is generally recognized. Even so, the Bankruptcy Code itself expressly authorizes only the former of these two remedies. Although common law uniformly acknowledges the power of a court to recast a claim asserted by a creditor as an equity interest in an appropriate case, the Bankruptcy Code is silent upon the availability of the remedy in a bankruptcy case.