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Courts disagree as to whether the amount that a bankruptcy trustee or chapter 11 debtor-in-possession ("DIP" ) can recover in fraudulent transfer avoidance litigation should be capped at the total amount of unsecured claims against the estate. A Delaware bankruptcy court recently weighed in on this issue in PAH Litigation Trust v. Water Street Healthcare Partners, L.P. (In re Physiotherapy Holdings, Inc.), 2017 WL 5054308 (Bankr. D. Del. Nov. 1, 2017). Noting the absence of any guidance on the question from the U.S.

The ability of a trustee or chapter 11 debtor in possession ("DIP") to sell bankruptcy estate assets "free and clear" of liens on the property under section 363(f) of the Bankruptcy Code has long been recognized as one of the most powerful tools for restructuring a debtor’s balance sheet and generating value in bankruptcy.

Under the Bankruptcy Code, a bankruptcy trustee or chapter 11 debtor in possession (“DIP”) is required to satisfy postpetition obligations under any unexpired lease of commercial property pending a decision to assume or reject the lease. Specifically, section 365(d)(3) requires the trustee, with limited exceptions, to “timely perform all the obligations of the debtor . . . arising from and after the order for relief” under any unexpired lease of nonresidential real property with respect to which the debtor is the lessee.

“Safe harbors” in the Bankruptcy Code designed to minimize “systemic risk”—disruption in the securities and commodities markets that could otherwise be caused by a counterparty’s bankruptcy filing—have been the focus of a considerable amount of judicial scrutiny in recent years. The latest contribution to this growing body of sometimes controversial jurisprudence was recently handed down by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.

The ability of a trustee or chapter 11 debtor in possession (“DIP”) to sell bankruptcy estate assets “free and clear” of competing interests in the property has long been recognized as one of the most important advantages of a bankruptcy filing as a vehicle for restructuring a debtor’s balance sheet and generating value. Still, section 363(f) of the Bankruptcy Code, which delineates the circumstances under which an asset can be sold free and clear of “any interest in such property,” has generated a fair amount of controversy.

In Industrial Enterprises of America v. Burtis (In re Pitt Penn Holding Co., Inc.), 2012 WL 204095 (Bankr. D. Del. Jan.

Background
Facts

Decision


On March 1 2011 Tokyo District Court issued a decision which admitted the right of avoidance exercised by the court-appointed administrator of a corporate debtor in possession under civil rehabilitation proceedings, where the debtor company had settled a mortgage for a financing company as the real guarantor of its parent company.

Background

The ability to sell an asset in bankruptcy free and clear of liens and any other competing “interest” is a well-recognized tool available to a trustee or chapter 11 debtor in possession (“DIP”). Whether the category of “interests” encompassed by that power extends to potential successor liability claims, however, has been the subject of considerable debate in the courts. A New York bankruptcy court recently addressed this controversial issue in Olson v. Frederico (In re Grumman Olson Indus., Inc.), 445 B.R. 243(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011).

Section 503(b) of the Bankruptcy Code delineates categories of claims that are entitled to elevated priority as “administrative expenses.” Under section 503(b)(3)(D), administrative expenses include “actual, necessary expenses” incurred by a creditor, indenture trustee, equity holder, or unofficial committee “in making a substantial contribution” in a chapter 11 case.

Over the past five years, courts have issued rulings of potential concern to buyers of distressed debt. Courts have addressed, among other things, “loan to own” acquisition strategies resulting in vote designation; equitable subordination, disallowance, and other lender liability exposure based upon the claim seller’s misconduct; disclosure requirements for ad hoc committees of debtholders; the adequacy of standardized claims-trading agreements; and claim-filing requirements in the era of computerized records.