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It begins with an awkward mouthful. Outside a bankruptcy brief, is “unimpairment” even a word? (No, per Merriam-Webster.) Inside Chapter 11, it’s much more: a trend.

Want to refinance your bonds cheaply? Are you an otherwise sound and solvent business, forced into bankruptcy by a massive fire (PG&E), persistent low commodity pricing (Ultra Petroleum), or a pandemic (Hertz, whose airport rental business was shuttered in 2020 by COVID-19)?

Or would you just prefer to boost your stock value by lowering your coupon?

This is how Tribune ends: not with a bang, but a whimper. The 12-year litigation saga, rooted in the spectacular failure of the media and sports conglomerate’s 2007 leveraged buyout, reached an end in late February with a curt “cert. denied” from the US Supreme Court.

Morgan Lewis was one of the firms that captained the defense for Tribune’s former shareholders. This post notes some lessons that we learned—and relearned.

Lesson One: Section 546(e)’s ‘New’ Safe Harbor

Supreme Court to Resolve Circuit Split on Constitutionality of U.S. Trustee Fee Hike

When existing interest holders attempt to retain ownership of a chapter 11 debtor after confirmation of a nonconsensual plan of reorganization, the Bankruptcy Code's plan confirmation requirements, including well-established rules regarding the classification and treatment of creditor claims and equity interests, can create formidable impediments to their reorganization strategy. In In re Platinum Corral, LLC, 2022 WL 127431 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Jan. 13, 2022), the U.S.

The US Supreme Court tends to hear a couple of bankruptcy cases per term. Most of these cases deal with interpreting provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. However, every few years or so, the Supreme Court decides a constitutional issue in bankruptcy. Some are agita-inducing (Northern Pipeline, Stern), some less so (Katz). The upcoming case is a little more nuanced, but could have major consequences.

Insight

Consider a lender that extends a term loan in the amount of $1 million to an entity debtor. The loan is guaranteed by the debtor’s owner. If both the debtor and the guarantor become subject to bankruptcy cases, it is settled that the lender has a claim of $1 million (ignoring interest and expenses) in each bankruptcy case. However, the lender cannot recover more than $1 million in total in the two cases combined. (Ivanhoe Building & Loan Ass'n of Newark, NJ v. Orr, 295 U.S. 243 (1935).)

WHITE PAPER Recent Trends in Corporate Debt and Reorganizations: Laying the Groundwork for Future Large Chapter 11 Cases or Just More Runway? After commercial Chapter 11 filings soared to their highest levels in more than a decade in 2020, the numbers gradually came back to Earth in the latter part of 2020 and, in 2021, fell well below annual averages. The primary driver of this reversal was twofold: swift and robust central bank intervention around the world and readily available and affordable capital from banks, private equity, and hedge funds.

The finality of sales of assets in bankruptcy is an indispensable feature of U.S. bankruptcy law, designed to maximize the value of a bankruptcy estate as expeditiously as possible for the benefit of all stakeholders. Promoting the finality of bankruptcy asset sales is the Bankruptcy Code's prohibition of reversal or modification on appeal of an order approving a sale to a good-faith purchaser unless the party challenging the sale obtains a stay pending appeal. This bar of appellate review is commonly referred to as "statutory mootness."

In Short

The Situation: In the recent decision of Morton as Liquidator of MJ Woodman Electrical Contractors Pty Ltd v Metal Manufacturers Pty Limited [2021] FCAFC 228, the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia considered the availability of mutual set-off provisions in s 553C the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) as a defence to unfair preference claims.

Nine Point Energy Holdings, Inc. and its affiliates (collectively, "Nine Point" or "Nine Point debtors") constituted an oil and gas production and exploration company that sought to reorganize in chapter 11 through a going concern sale of substantially all of their assets. To maximize value, Nine Point sought to sell those assets free and clear of its midstream services contracts, which included provisions that prevented Nine Point from acquiring midstream services from anyone other than its counterparty, Caliber North Dakota, LLC ("Caliber").