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Introduced by the Corporate Insolvency and Governance Act 2020, the restructuring plans regime set out in Part 26A of the Companies Act 2006 (Plans) has quickly proven a popular route for corporate financial rescue. This is in large part due to the fact that it allows for a plan to be imposed upon dissenting creditor classes in certain circumstances. This is known as "cross-class cramdown".

Asset freeze measures enacted by the United Kingdom against designated persons (DPs) can, under certain circumstances, extend to entities “owned or controlled” by DPs. To date, there have been few—and at times partly contradictory—English court cases addressing the “ownership and control” criteria under the UK sanctions regime. The latest judgment in Hellard v OJSC Rossiysky Kredit Bank sought to reconcile the previous guidance provided by the courts in the Mints and Litasco cases.

The US Supreme Court ruled in a landmark 5-4 decision on June 27, 2024 that nonconsensual third-party releases, as proposed in Purdue Pharma’s bankruptcy plan, were not permissible under the Bankruptcy Code. A nonconsensual third-party release serves to eliminate the direct claims of third parties against nondebtor parties without soliciting the consent of such affected claimants. This contrasts with consensual releases and opt-in or opt-out mechanisms permitted by courts.

This article was first published by Insol World Magazine in Q1 of 2024.

Insolvency office-holders in the UK and elsewhere frequently rely upon litigation funders to finance their legal proceedings and, accordingly, developments in the funding market are of keen interest to insolvency professionals.

Two recent cases out of the Third Circuit and the Southern District of New York highlight some of the developing formulas US courts are using when engaging with foreign debtors. In a case out of the Third Circuit, Vertivv. Wayne Burt, the court expanded on factors to be considered when deciding whether international comity requires the dismissal of US civil claims that impact foreign insolvency proceedings.

When a majority of a company’s board approves a tender offer in good faith, can it still be avoided as an actually fraudulent transfer? Yes, says the Delaware Bankruptcy Court, holding that the fraudulent intent of a corporation’s CEO who was a board member and exercised control over the board can be imputed to the corporation, even if he was the sole actor with fraudulent intent.

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