The Eleventh Circuit recently found in favor of Blue Bell Creameries, Inc. by rejecting its own earlier dicta and explicitly expanding the preference payment defense known as “new value.” This provides additional protection for companies doing business with a debtor in the 90 days prior to bankruptcy.

THE SCOOP: BRUNO’S V. BLUE BELL

In the recent court decision of Trenfield v HAG Import Corporation (Australia) Pty Ltd [2018] QDC 107, the liquidators recovered unfair preferences from a retention of title creditor who argued it was a secured creditor.

The issues

In the recent decision of Heavy Plant Leasing [2018] NSWSC 707, a creditor successfully defended an unfair preference claim by establishing it did not have reasonable grounds to suspect the insolvency of the debtor company, who was a subcontractor in the earth moving business.

The most common way of defending a liquidator’s unfair preferences claim is to rely upon section 588FG(2) of the Corporations Act 2001(Cth); commonly called the ‘good faith defence’.

On May 22, 2018, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit issued its decision in Franchise Services of North America v. United States Trustees (In re Franchise Services of North America), 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 13332 (5th Cir. May 22, 2018). That decision affirms the lower court’s holding that a “golden share” is valid and necessary to filing when held by a true investor, even if such investor is controlled by a creditor.

Commonly, a creditor being sued by a liquidator to refund an alleged unfair preference is owed money by the company in liquidation.

Liquidators argue that under section 553(c)(1) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Act) a creditor is not able to set-off the outstanding indebtedness owed by the company to the creditor to reduce any liability of the creditor to refund any unfair preference. Similar arguments are made by liquidators in relation to insolvent trading claims.

A snapshot of the court decisions

The Circuit Courts of Appeal have split on whether a prepetition transfer made by a debtor is avoidable if the transfer was made through a financial intermediary that was a mere conduit. Today, the Supreme Court unanimously resolved the split by deciding that transfers through “mere conduits” are not protected. This is a major (and adverse) decision for lenders, bondholders and noteholders who receive payments through an intermediary such as a disbursing agent.

Just because a liquidator asserts you have received an unfair preference, does not necessarily mean you have or that there are no potential defences available to you.

It is common for commercial contracts to contain ipso facto clauses, which allow a party to terminate or modify the terms of the contract where the other party experiences an insolvency event. A concern addressed by the Government is that these clauses can prevent a financially distressed company from turning their situation around.

The High Court’s recent decision in Ramsay Health Care Australia Pty Ltd v Compton [2017] HCA 28 has confirmed a bankruptcy court can exercise a discretion to go behind the judgment debt where sufficient reason is shown for questioning whether there is a debt due to the petitioning creditor.

In the recent decision of Lane (Trustee), in the matter of Lee (Bankrupt) v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation [2017] FCA 953, Cooper Grace Ward acted for the trustee in bankruptcy, who sought directions from the Court regarding the administration of a trading trust where the bankrupt was the trustee.

Facts