Introduction

The first stage in any restructuring by way of a scheme of arrangement in the Cayman Islands involves meetings of such classes of creditors or shareholders (as the case may be) to consider, and if thought fit, approve the terms of the scheme. An application to Court is required for orders to be granted for convening such meetings. If, at these meetings, the requisite statutory majorities are satisfied, the second stage involves obtaining Court sanction for the proposed scheme to become effective.

Bermuda, the British Virgin Islands and the Cayman Islands all have legislation that enables a company to present a scheme of arrangement to restructure its debts.

One of the defining features of a scheme of arrangement carried out under the relevant legislation in each jurisdiction is the ability to cram down dissenting creditors or members (or classes of them, as the case may be) if the requisite statutory majorities are satisfied and Court sanction of the proposed scheme is obtained.

A recent judgment of the United Kingdom Supreme Court in Brake & Anor v The Chedington Court Estate Ltd [2023] UKSC 29 (10 August 2023) is likely to be a welcome decision for liquidators and trustees in bankruptcy in setting clear boundaries as to who has standing to challenge their decision-making in corporate or personal insolvency contexts.

On December 5, 2022, in In re Global Cord Blood Corp., 2022 WL 17478530 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Dec. 5, 2022) (“Global Cord”), the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York (the “Court”) denied recognition of a proceeding pending in the Grand Court of the Cayman Islands (the “Cayman Proceeding” and the court, the “Cayman Court”) because it was more like a corporate governance and fraud remediation effort than a collective proceeding for the purpose of dealing with reorganization or liquidation, as Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code requires.

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On August 5, 2021, the Eighth Circuit reversed a district court’s decision to dismiss a confirmation order appeal as equitably moot.[1] The doctrine of equitable mootness can require dismissal of an appeal of a bankruptcy court decision – typically, an order confirming a chapter 11 plan – on equitable grounds when third parties have engaged in significant irreversible transactions

On October 5, 2021, the Tenth Circuit joined the Second Circuit in concluding statutory fee increases that applied only to debtors filing for bankruptcy in judicial districts administered by the United States Trustee Program (the “US Trustee” or the “UST Program”) violated the U.S.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit recently ruled in a case involving a Chapter 13 debtors’ attempt to shield contributions to a 401(k) retirement account from “projected disposable income,” therefore making such amounts inaccessible to the debtors’ creditors.^[1] For the reasons explained below, the Sixth Circuit rejected the debtors’ arguments.

Case Background

A statute must be interpreted and enforced as written, regardless, according to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, “of whether a court likes the results of that application in a particular case.” That legal maxim guided the Sixth Circuit’s reasoning in a recent decision^[1] in a case involving a Chapter 13 debtor’s repeated filings and requests for dismissal of his bankruptcy cases in order to avoid foreclosure of his home.

As a matter of practice, chapter 11 plans and confirmation orders routinely discharge administrative expense claims, including those that arise after confirmation of a plan but before its effective date. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit (the “Third Circuit”) recently affirmed the bankruptcy court’s statutory authority to do so in Ellis v. Westinghouse Electric Co., LLC, 2021 WL 3852612 (3d Cir. Aug. 30, 2021).