Some six years after the United States Supreme Court decided Stern v. Marshall, courts continue to grapple with the decision’s meaning and how much it curtails the exercise of bankruptcy court jurisdiction.[1] The U.S.

In a decision that will reassure investors in Cayman Islands investment funds and other vehicles, the Grand Court has shown its willingness to facilitate the investigation of legitimate concerns raised during a voluntary liquidation.1

The decision is the first written ruling on the Court's power to defer the dissolution of a Cayman Islands company in voluntary liquidation under section 151(3) of the Companies Law and also considers the Court's power to bring a voluntary liquidation under the Court's supervision in the context of an investigation into possible wrongdoing.

On March 22, 2017, the United States Supreme Court held that bankruptcy courts cannot approve a “structured dismissal”—a dismissal with special conditions or that does something other than restoring the “prepetition financial status quo”—providing for distributions that deviate from the Bankruptcy Code’s priority scheme absent the consent of affected creditors. Czyzewski v.Jevic Holding Corp., No. 15-649, 580 U.S. ___ (2017), 2017 WL 1066259, at *3 (Mar. 22, 2017).

On January 17, 2017, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit issued its long-anticipated opinion in Marblegate Asset Management, LLC v. Education Management Finance Corp., 1 ruling that Section 316(b) of the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C. § 77ppp(b) (the “Act”), prohibits only non-consensual amendments to core payment terms of bond indentures.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recently articulated a standard to determine what claims may be barred against a purchaser of assets "free and clear" of claims pursuant to section 363(f) of the Bankruptcy Code and highlighted procedural due process concerns with respect to enforcement.¹  The decision arose out of litigation regarding certain defects, including the well-known "ignition switch defect," affecting certain GM vehicles.  GM's successor (which acquired GM's assets in a section 363 sale in 2009) asserted that a "free and clear" provisi

On March 29, 2016, the Second Circuit addressed the breadth and application of the Bankruptcy Code's safe harbor provisions in an opinion that applied to two cases before it.  The court analyzed whether: (i) the Bankruptcy Code's safe harbor provisions preempt individual creditors' state law fraudulent conveyance claims; and (ii) the automatic stay bars creditors from asserting such claims while the trustee is actively pursuing similar claims under the Bankruptcy Code.  In In re Tribune Co.

The Grand Court of the Cayman Islands has held that depositor protection provisions in Cayman Islands law only apply in respect of depositors with deposits of CI$20,000 (US$24,400) or less.¹  Depositors with more than CI$20,000 on deposit do not benefit from such provisions at all, even for their first CI$20,000.  This means that, for persuasive policy reasons, the position in the Cayman Islands differs from the position in the EU under the deposit guarantee scheme.

The District Court for the Central District of California recently held that an assignee that acquired rights to a terminated swap agreement was not a "swap participant" under the Bankruptcy Code and, therefore, could not invoke safe harbors based on that status to foreclose on collateral in the face of the automatic stay. ^[1] The court ruled that the assignee acquired only a right to collect payment under the swap agreement, not the assignor's rights under the Bankruptcy Code to exercise remedies without first seeking court approval.

Background

A recent decision of the Grand Court, Primeo Fund (in official liquidation) v Herald Fund SPC (in official liquidation)¹, is another win for investor certainty in the Cayman Islands.  In previous updates, we have written about Cayman Islands and BVI decisions which illustrate the various challenges associated with bringing clawback actions in the Cayman Islands against innocent arm's length mutual fund investors who have validly redeemed their shares.²  That message has been further reinforced, on different grounds, by Jones J in P

On May 21, 2015, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit (the "Third Circuit") held that in rare instances a bankruptcy court may approve a "structured dismissal"- that is, a dismissal "that winds up the bankruptcy with certain conditions attached instead of simply dismissing the case and restoring the status quo ante" - that deviates from the Bankruptcy Code's priority scheme. See Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors v. CIT Group/Business Credit Inc. (In re Jevic Holding Corp.), Case No.