Section 541(a) of the Bankruptcy Code creates a worldwide estate comprising all of the legal or equitable interests of the debtor, “wherever located,” held by the debtor as of the filing date.¹ The Bankruptcy Code’s automatic stay, in turn, applies “to all entities” and protects the debtor’s property and the bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction by barring “any act to obtain possession of property of the estate . . .

Last month, District Court Judge Shira A. Scheindlin of the Southern District of New York affirmed a bankruptcy court ruling which held that the environmental cleanup obligations of debtor Mark IV Industries, Inc. were not discharged in bankruptcy.2 Given the current legal landscape, Mark IV may make the likelihood of discharging environmental claims even more difficult, potentially undermining chapter 11 as an optimal alternative for companies saddled with environmental liabilities.

On September 2, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed a holding by the Court of Chancery that creditors of insolvent Delaware limited liability companies do not have standing to sue derivatively. This contrasts with Delaware corporations: the Delaware courts have recognized that when a corporation becomes insolvent, creditors become the residual risk-bearers and are permitted to sue derivatively on behalf of a corporation to the same extent as stockholders.

Introduction

On June 23, 2011, after fifteen years of hugely acrimonious litigation, the Supreme Court of the United States (the “Court”) issued a decision on a narrow legal issue that may end up significantly limiting the scope of bankruptcy courts’ core jurisdiction.  

Section 108 of the Bankruptcy Code grants a two-year extension of time for a trustee in bankruptcy (or a debtor in possession) to bring law suits, provided that the applicable period to sue didn’t expire before the petition date. It also gives a short extension to the trustee for filing pleadings, curing defaults, and performing other acts on behalf of the debtor. These provisions afford a trustee and debtor in possession valuable time to discover and evaluate potential causes of action and to perform other acts to preserve the debtor’s rights.

When a company saddled with potential environmental liabilities seeks bankruptcy protection, the goals of Chapter 11—giving the reorganized debtor a “fresh start” and fairly treating similarly situated creditors—can conflict with the goals of environmental laws, such as ensuring that the “polluter pays.” Courts have long struggled to reconcile this tension.

A degree of certainty—for the time being—has been restored for participants in the commercial lending and debt trading markets who have been tracking the appeal of a controversial 2009 fraudulent transfer decision in the TOUSA, Inc. bankruptcy case.i On February 11, 2011, Judge Gold of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida quashed (or nullified)ii the bankruptcy court’s decision, which ordered a group of lenders to disgorge $480 million received in connection with loans they extended to a joint venture involving TOUSA, Inc.

On January 24, 2011, the Honorable Dwight H. Williams, Jr. of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Alabama denied the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation’s (“FDIC”) request for relief from the automatic stay in the Colonial BancGroup, Inc.

The FDIC is currently responding to one of the worst financial crises in the history of the nation’s banking system. Sheila Bair, Chairman of the FDIC, expects that 2010 “will be the high water mark for the banking crisis.”1 Just over the last two years, 268 banks have failed in the United States, which is nearly ten times the number of failed banks during the prior eight-year period.2

In a recent decision, SEC v Byers,1 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that district courts possess the authority and discretion to bar the filing of involuntary bankruptcy petitions without the district court’s permission.