In a decision that will reassure investors in Cayman Islands investment funds and other vehicles, the Grand Court has shown its willingness to facilitate the investigation of legitimate concerns raised during a voluntary liquidation.1

The decision is the first written ruling on the Court's power to defer the dissolution of a Cayman Islands company in voluntary liquidation under section 151(3) of the Companies Law and also considers the Court's power to bring a voluntary liquidation under the Court's supervision in the context of an investigation into possible wrongdoing.

On March 22, 2017, the United States Supreme Court held that bankruptcy courts cannot approve a “structured dismissal”—a dismissal with special conditions or that does something other than restoring the “prepetition financial status quo”—providing for distributions that deviate from the Bankruptcy Code’s priority scheme absent the consent of affected creditors. Czyzewski v.Jevic Holding Corp., No. 15-649, 580 U.S. ___ (2017), 2017 WL 1066259, at *3 (Mar. 22, 2017).

On March 29, 2016, the Second Circuit addressed the breadth and application of the Bankruptcy Code's safe harbor provisions in an opinion that applied to two cases before it.  The court analyzed whether: (i) the Bankruptcy Code's safe harbor provisions preempt individual creditors' state law fraudulent conveyance claims; and (ii) the automatic stay bars creditors from asserting such claims while the trustee is actively pursuing similar claims under the Bankruptcy Code.  In In re Tribune Co.

The Grand Court of the Cayman Islands has held that depositor protection provisions in Cayman Islands law only apply in respect of depositors with deposits of CI$20,000 (US$24,400) or less.¹  Depositors with more than CI$20,000 on deposit do not benefit from such provisions at all, even for their first CI$20,000.  This means that, for persuasive policy reasons, the position in the Cayman Islands differs from the position in the EU under the deposit guarantee scheme.

The District Court for the Central District of California recently held that an assignee that acquired rights to a terminated swap agreement was not a "swap participant" under the Bankruptcy Code and, therefore, could not invoke safe harbors based on that status to foreclose on collateral in the face of the automatic stay. ^[1] The court ruled that the assignee acquired only a right to collect payment under the swap agreement, not the assignor's rights under the Bankruptcy Code to exercise remedies without first seeking court approval.

Background

A recent decision of the Grand Court, Primeo Fund (in official liquidation) v Herald Fund SPC (in official liquidation)¹, is another win for investor certainty in the Cayman Islands.  In previous updates, we have written about Cayman Islands and BVI decisions which illustrate the various challenges associated with bringing clawback actions in the Cayman Islands against innocent arm's length mutual fund investors who have validly redeemed their shares.²  That message has been further reinforced, on different grounds, by Jones J in P

On May 21, 2015, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit (the "Third Circuit") held that in rare instances a bankruptcy court may approve a "structured dismissal"- that is, a dismissal "that winds up the bankruptcy with certain conditions attached instead of simply dismissing the case and restoring the status quo ante" - that deviates from the Bankruptcy Code's priority scheme. See Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors v. CIT Group/Business Credit Inc. (In re Jevic Holding Corp.), Case No.

Last week, the Cayman Islands Court of Appeal handed down its judgment in Weavering Macro Fixed Income Fund Limited (in Liquidation) (the "Fund") v Stefan Peterson and Hans Ekstrom (the "Directors").  The appeal from the first instance decision was allowed and the Grand Court's order of 26 August 2011 was set aside.  

On October 31, 2014, Bankruptcy Judge Kaplan of the District of New Jersey addressed two issues critically important to intellectual property licensees and purchasers: (i) can a trademark  licensee use section 365(n) of the Bankruptcy Code to keep licensed marks following a  debtor-licensor’s rejection of a license agreement?; and (ii) can a “free and clear” sale of  intellectual property eliminate any rights retained by a licensee? In re Crumbs Bake Shop, Inc., et  al., 2014 WL 5508177 (Bankr. D.N.J. Oct. 31, 2014).

Earlier this year, we reported on a decision limiting a secured creditor's right to credit bid purchased debt (capping the credit bid at the discounted price paid for the debt) to facilitate an auction in Fisker Automotive Holdings' chapter 11 case.¹ In the weeks that followed, the debtor held a competitive (nineteen-round) auction and ultimately selected Wanxiang America Corporation, rather than the secured creditor, as the w