The ability to "surcharge" a secured creditor's collateral in bankruptcy is an important resource available to a bankruptcy trustee or chapter 11 debtor in possession ("DIP"), particularly in cases where there is little or no equity in the estate to pay administrative costs, such as the fees and expenses of estate-retained professionals. However, as demonstrated by a ruling handed down by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, the circumstances under which collateral may be surcharged are narrow. In In re Towne, Inc., 2013 BL 232068 (3d Cir. Aug.

Section 506(a) of the Bankruptcy Code contemplates bifurcation of a debtor's obligation to a secured creditor into secured and unsecured claims, depending on the value of the collateral securing the debt. The term "value," however, is not defined in the Bankruptcy Code, and bankruptcy courts vary in their approaches to the meaning of the term. In In re Heritage Highgate, Inc., 679 F.3d 132 (3d Cir.

On May 15, 2012, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit issued a decision^[1]  in the much-watched litigation involving the residential construction company, TOUSA, Inc. ("TOUSA"). The decision reversed the prior decision of the District Court, ^[2] reinstating the ruling of the Bankruptcy Court.^[3]

Background

Indentures often contain make-whole premiums payable upon early redemption of the debt, and term B loan agreements often include "soft call" protection in the form of prepayment premiums during the early life of the loan. If the debt issuer becomes subject to a chapter 11 proceeding after the debt issuance, the question then arises as to how this payment obligation is to be treated: Does the make-whole or prepayment premium constitute unmatured interest due as a result of the debt acceleration, which would be disallowed, or is it liquidated damages?

The ability to sell an asset in bankruptcy free and clear of liens and any other competing “interest” is a well-recognized tool available to a trustee or chapter 11 debtor in possession (“DIP”). Whether the category of “interests” encompassed by that power extends to potential successor liability claims, however, has been the subject of considerable debate in the courts. A New York bankruptcy court recently addressed this controversial issue in Olson v. Frederico (In re Grumman Olson Indus., Inc.), 445 B.R. 243(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011).