The ability to "surcharge" a secured creditor's collateral in bankruptcy is an important resource available to a bankruptcy trustee or chapter 11 debtor in possession ("DIP"), particularly in cases where there is little or no equity in the estate to pay administrative costs, such as the fees and expenses of estate-retained professionals. However, as demonstrated by a ruling handed down by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, the circumstances under which collateral may be surcharged are narrow. In In re Towne, Inc., 2013 BL 232068 (3d Cir. Aug.
Edgewater Growth Capital Partners LP v. H.I.G. Capital, Inc., 68 A.3d 197 (2013)
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Ad Hoc Group of Vitro Noteholders v. Vitro S.A.B. de C.V., 701 F.3d 1031 (5th Cir. 2012)
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Inre Brooke Capital Corp., 2012 WL 4793010 (Bankr. D. Kan., Oct. 5, 2012)
Section 506(a) of the Bankruptcy Code contemplates bifurcation of a debtor's obligation to a secured creditor into secured and unsecured claims, depending on the value of the collateral securing the debt. The term "value," however, is not defined in the Bankruptcy Code, and bankruptcy courts vary in their approaches to the meaning of the term. In In re Heritage Highgate, Inc., 679 F.3d 132 (3d Cir.
Inre Zais Investment Grade Limited VII, 455 B.R. 839 (2011)
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In June 2011, the United States Supreme Court issued its opinion in the case known as Stern v. Marshall. The U.S. Supreme Court held that filing a proof of claim in a bankruptcy case does not constitute consent to the bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction over all counterclaims or actions that the bankruptcy estate may later bring against the creditor.
In fact, filing the proof of claim constitutes consent only to those claims or actions that either (1) stem from the bankruptcy case itself; or (2) are necessary to the resolution of the creditor’s proof of claim.
In re General Growth Props., Inc., Case No. 09-11977 (ALG), 2011 BL 189724 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. July 20, 2011)
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The ability to sell an asset in bankruptcy free and clear of liens and any other competing “interest” is a well-recognized tool available to a trustee or chapter 11 debtor in possession (“DIP”). Whether the category of “interests” encompassed by that power extends to potential successor liability claims, however, has been the subject of considerable debate in the courts. A New York bankruptcy court recently addressed this controversial issue in Olson v. Frederico (In re Grumman Olson Indus., Inc.), 445 B.R. 243(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011).
A Virginia bankruptcy court has issued a decision that should be a major eye-opener for any entity that engages in tax-free exchanges under section 1031 of the Internal Revenue Code.