On 3 December 2020, the UK Government (HM Treasury) issued a consultation paper (the Consultation) setting out a proposal to implement a new “special administration regime” (the SAR) which it is proposed would apply to any insolvency of an authorised payment institution (a PI) or electronic money institution (an EMI).

On 3 December 2020, HM Treasury published the Government's proposal to implement a new special administration regime for PIs and EMIs (PI and EMI SAR), a copy of which can be seen here.

Gerade im Anbetracht der aus der Corona-Pandemie folgenden Krise stellt sich die Frage: Was passiert mit Token in der Insolvenz, insbesondere, wenn sie von einem Dienstleister für seine Kunden verwahrt werden?

Especially in view of the crisis resulting from the Coronavirus pandemic, the question arises: What happens to tokens in insolvency, especially if they are held in safekeeping by a service provider for his customers?

Als Teil des gesetzgeberischen Maßnahmenpakets zur Abmilderung der wirtschaftlichen Auswirkungen der COVID-19-Pandemie erleichtert das COVID-19-Insolvenzaussetzungsgesetz (COVInsAG) die rechtssichere Finanzierung kriselnder Unternehmen und setzt Anreize an deren Gesellschafterkreise: der Nachrang von Gesellschafterdarlehen und das Erfordernis eines Sanierungsgutachtens sind durch das COVInsAG suspendiert.

Debt exchanges have long been utilized by distressed companies to address liquidity concerns and to take advantage of beneficial market conditions. A company saddled with burdensome debt obligations, for example, may seek to exchange existing notes for new notes with the same outstanding principal but with borrower-favorable terms, like delayed payment or extended maturation dates (a "Face Value Exchange"). Or the company might seek to exchange existing notes for new notes with a lower face amount, motivated by discounted trading values for the existing notes (a "Fair Value Exchange").

One of the primary fights underlying assumption of an unexpired lease or executory contract has long been over whether any debtor breaches under the agreement are “curable.” Before the 2005 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code, courts were split over whether historic nonmonetary breaches (such as a failure to maintain cash reserves or prescribed hours of operation) undermined a debtor’s ability to assume the lease or contract.