Introduction

The immediate focus for Britain’s authorities when dealing with the COVID-19 pandemic has been, quite rightly, to secure the best possible health outcome for the greatest number of people.

Subsequently, following a wave of concern regarding the best way of maintaining the financial status-quo for (i) businesses, (ii) employees, and (iii) individuals, the UK government announced an unprecedented series of assistance programmes, designed to counter the impact of previously unknown, and unquantifiable, distress.

Debt exchanges have long been utilized by distressed companies to address liquidity concerns and to take advantage of beneficial market conditions. A company saddled with burdensome debt obligations, for example, may seek to exchange existing notes for new notes with the same outstanding principal but with borrower-favorable terms, like delayed payment or extended maturation dates (a "Face Value Exchange"). Or the company might seek to exchange existing notes for new notes with a lower face amount, motivated by discounted trading values for the existing notes (a "Fair Value Exchange").

One of the primary fights underlying assumption of an unexpired lease or executory contract has long been over whether any debtor breaches under the agreement are “curable.” Before the 2005 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code, courts were split over whether historic nonmonetary breaches (such as a failure to maintain cash reserves or prescribed hours of operation) undermined a debtor’s ability to assume the lease or contract.