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Background

In our previous publication on the subject, we had discussed the changes introduced by the Ordinance dated 23 November 2017 (the Ordinance), amending the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (Code) (see our Ergo Newsflash dated 24 November 2017).

Background

The partly liberalized Indian economy has been aptly referred to in the Economic Survey of India 2015-16 as one that had transitioned from ‘socialism with limited entry to “marketism” without exit.

Given the vexed ‘twin balance sheet’ problem chafing both banks and corporates in India, the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC/Code) was a critical structural reform. Many issues have surfaced since the Code was operationalised and the courts and the Central Government have stepped in to iron out such issues in the last one year.

Debt exchanges have long been utilized by distressed companies to address liquidity concerns and to take advantage of beneficial market conditions. A company saddled with burdensome debt obligations, for example, may seek to exchange existing notes for new notes with the same outstanding principal but with borrower-favorable terms, like delayed payment or extended maturation dates (a "Face Value Exchange"). Or the company might seek to exchange existing notes for new notes with a lower face amount, motivated by discounted trading values for the existing notes (a "Fair Value Exchange").

One of the primary fights underlying assumption of an unexpired lease or executory contract has long been over whether any debtor breaches under the agreement are “curable.” Before the 2005 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code, courts were split over whether historic nonmonetary breaches (such as a failure to maintain cash reserves or prescribed hours of operation) undermined a debtor’s ability to assume the lease or contract.